Still living with mortality: The longevity risk transfer market after one decade by Blake, D. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Blake, D., Cairns, A. J. G., Dowd, K. and Kessler, A.R. (2019). Still living with 
mortality: The longevity risk transfer market after one decade. British Actuarial Journal, 24, 
e1. doi: 10.1017/S1357321718000314 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/21039/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1357321718000314
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
British Actuarial Journal, Vol. 24, e1, pp. 1–80. © Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 2019. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which
permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
doi:10.1017/S1357321718000314
Still living with mortality: the longevity risk transfer
market after one decade
D. Blake*, A. J. G. Cairns, K. Dowd and A. R. Kessler
[Presented to the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, Edinburgh, 29 January 2018]
Abstract
This paper updates Living with Mortality published in 2006. It describes how the longevity risk
transfer market has developed over the intervening period, and, in particular, how insurance-based
solutions – buy-outs, buy-ins and longevity insurance – have triumphed over capital markets solu-
tions that were expected to dominate at the time. Some capital markets solutions – longevity-spread
bonds, longevity swaps, q-forwards and tail-risk protection – have come to market, but the volume of
business has been disappointingly low. The reason for this is that when market participants compare
the index-based solutions of the capital markets with the customised solutions of insurance companies
in terms of basis risk, credit risk, regulatory capital, collateral and liquidity, the former perform
on balance less favourably despite a lower potential cost. We discuss the importance of stochastic
mortality models for forecasting future longevity and examine some applications of these models, e.g.
determining the longevity risk premium and estimating regulatory capital relief. The longevity risk
transfer market is now beginning to recognise that there is insufﬁcient capacity in the insurance and
reinsurance industries to deal fully with demand and new solutions for attracting capital markets
investors are now being examined – such as longevity-linked securities and reinsurance sidecars.
Keywords
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q-Forwards; Tail-Risk Protection; Basis Risk; Credit Risk; Regulatory Capital; Collateral;
Liquidity; Stochastic Mortality Models; Longevity Risk Premium; Longevity-Linked Securities;
Reinsurance Sidecars
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
1.1.1. A little over a decade ago, the longevity risk transfer market started. This is now a global
market, but it began in the UK in 2006. To coincide with the setup of this market, the British
Actuarial Journal published Living with Mortality (Blake et al., 2006a). That paper examined the
problem of longevity risk – the risk surrounding uncertain aggregate mortality – and discussed the
ways in which life insurers, annuity providers and pension plans could manage their exposure to this
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risk. In particular, it focused on how they could use mortality-linked securities and over-the-counter
contracts – some existing and others still hypothetical – to manage their longevity risk exposures. It
provided a detailed analysis of two such securities – the Swiss Re mortality bond issued in December
2003 and the European Investment Bank (EIB)/BNP Paribas longevity bond announced in November
2004. It then looked at the universe of hypothetical mortality-linked securities – other forms of
longevity bonds, swaps, futures and options – and investigated their potential uses. It also addressed
implementation issues and drew lessons from the experience with other derivative contracts. Parti-
cular attention was paid to the issues involved with the construction and use of mortality indices, the
management of the associated credit risks and possible barriers to the development of markets for
these securities. The paper concluded that these implementation difﬁculties were essentially teething
problems that would be resolved over time, and so leave the way open to the development of a
ﬂourishing market in a brand new class of capital market securities.1
1.1.2. In the event, the EIB/BNP longevity bond did not attract sufﬁcient demand to get launched.
The Swiss Re mortality bond, known as Vita,2 was followed by broadly similar bonds from both
Swiss Re and other issuers, but the overall size of the issuance was fairly small. Swiss Re also
pioneered the successful issuance of a longevity-spread bond, known as Kortis,3 but again the size of
the issue was small. Investment banks, such as J. P. Morgan and Société Générale, introduced some
innovative derivatives contracts – q-forwards and tail risk protection – but, so far, only a few of these
contracts have been sold. Overall, then, the demand for the capital market solutions that have been
proposed for hedging longevity risk has been disappointingly low.
1.1.3. By contrast, the solutions offered by the insurance industry have been much more successful.
The key examples are the buy-out, the buy-in and longevity insurance. In other words, pension plan
trustees, sponsors and advisers preferred dealing with risk by means of insurance contracts which
fully removed the risk concerned and were not yet comfortable with capital market hedges that left
some residual basis risk.
1.2. Focus of This Paper
The present paper provides a review of the developments in longevity risk management over the last decade
or so. In particular, we focus on the ways in which pension plans and life insurers have managed their
exposure to longevity risk, on why capital market securities failed to take off in the way that was anticipated
10 years ago, and what solutions for managing longevity risk might become available in the future.
1.3. Layout of This Paper
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 quantiﬁes the potential size of the longevity risk market
globally. Section 3 discusses the different stakeholders in the market for longevity risk transfers.
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, examine the structure of the successful insurance-based and capital
market solutions that have been brought to market since 2006. The distinction between index and
1 As originally suggested in Blake & Burrows (2001), Dowd (2003) and Blake et al. (2006b).
2 http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/vita-capital-ltd/
Disclaimer: the web links in the footnotes were active at the time of the sessional meeting and the authors take no
responsibility for the ongoing maintenance of these links.
3 http://www.artemis.bm/deal_directory/kortis-capital-ltd/
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customised hedges and the issue of basis risk are investigated in section 6, while section 7 looks at
credit risk, regulatory capital and collateral and section 8 discusses liquidity. Stochastic mortality
models are crucial to the design and pricing of longevity risk transfer solutions and these are
reviewed in section 9, while some applications that use these models are considered in section 10.
Section 11 reviews the developments in the longevity de-risking market since 2006. Section 12 looks
at potential future risk transfer solutions that involve the capital markets and section 13 concludes.
2. Quantifying the Potential Size of the Longevity Risk Market
2.1. Michaelson & Mulholland (2014) recently estimated the potential size of the global longevity
risk market for pension liabilities at between $60trn and $80trn, comprising:
(i) The accumulated assets of private pension systems in the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) were $32.1trn,4 arising from: pension funds (67.9%),
banks and investment companies (18.5%), insurance companies (12.8%) and employers’ book
reserves (0.8%) at year-end 2012 (OECD, 2013).
(ii) The US social security system had unfunded obligations for past and current participants of
$24.3trn, as of the end of 2013 (Social Security Administration (SSA), 2013).
(iii) The aggregate liability of US State Retirement Systems was an additional $3trn, as of the end of
2012 (Morningstar, 2013), which does not capture the liabilities of countless US local and
municipal pension systems.
(iv) There are public social security systems in 170 countries (excluding the USA) that provide old-
age beneﬁts of some sort for which reliable size estimates are not readily available but which are
certainly substantial.5
2.2. Michaelson & Mulholland (2014) then estimated the size of the longevity risk underlying these
liabilities. Each additional year of unanticipated life expectancy at age 65 – roughly equivalent to a
0.8% increase in mortality improvements or a 13% reduction in mortality rates6– can increase pension
liabilities by 4–5%7 (Swiss Re Europe, 2012). Risk Management Solutions (RMS) estimated the
standard deviation of a sustained shock to annual mortality improvements (lasting 10 years or more)
relative to expectations at around 0.80%. Michaelson and Mulholland use this estimate to calculate
the effect of a longevity tail event (i.e. a 2.5 standard deviation event) which corresponds to a 2%
change in trend (0.80%×2.5=2%) and, in turn, implies that longevity-related liabilities could increase
by 10–12.5% as a result of unforeseen mortality improvements. Given aggregate global pension
liabilities of $60–80trn, these could, in the extreme, turn out to be between $6trn and 10trn higher.
2.3. Pigott & Walker (2016) also estimate that private sector longevity risk exposure is of the order
of $30trn.8 This is concentrated in the US ($14.460trn), the UK ($2.685trn), Australia ($1.639trn), Canada
($1.298trn), Holland ($1.282trn), Japan ($1.221trn), Switzerland ($0.788trn), South Africa ($0.306trn),
France ($0.272trn), South America ($0.251trn), Germany ($0.236trn) and Hong Kong ($0.110trn).
4 Revised to $38trn at the end of 2016 (OECD(2017) Global Pension Statistics).
5 Social Security Administration: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/
6 Own calculations, based on England & Wales mortality forecasts for males aged 65.
7 Corresponding to 2% and 0% real discount rates, respectively.
8 Derived from Aon Hewitt calculations, based on data from the OECD and European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
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Pigott and Walker argue that only the UK, USA, Canada and Holland currently have the conditions
for a longevity risk transfer market to develop. These conditions include: low interest rates (in part
due to government quantitative easing programmes in response to the 2007–2008 Global Financial
Crisis (GFC)) which, by increasing the present value of more distant pension payments, has exposed
the real extent of longevity risk in pension plans; inﬂation uplifting of pensions in payment further
increases longevity risk; frequent updating by the actuarial profession of longevity projections; the
introduction of market-consistent valuation methods; increased accounting transparency of pension
assets and liabilities; and increased intervention powers by the regulator. Collectively, these factors
have focussed the minds of plan trustees and sponsors and encouraged them to look for solutions
with their advisers.
2.4. The other markets do not currently have the right conditions for the following reasons:
∙ Australia: Most sponsors of pension plans bear little or no longevity risk; individuals often take a
lump sum or buy term (20-year) annuities at retirement, then rely on the state, although a lifetime
annuity market is beginning to emerge.
∙ Japan: Corporate sponsors of pension plans and insurers do not bear longevity risk, since
individuals buy term annuities at retirement; however, there is a growing market for long-term
annuities in Japan purchased from Australia.9
∙ Switzerland: Individuals are incentivised but not required to annuitise; the market is small, but
may open up in the future.
∙ Germany: Occupational plan liabilities are often written onto company balance sheets as book
reserves, so there is little resource or incentive to de-risk, despite longevity risk being as signiﬁcant
a risk as it is in other countries.
∙ France: A very small market, although French insurers and reinsurers are active in other markets.
∙ South Africa and South America: Hampered by lack of or unreliable historical mortality data and
poor experience data; in Chile, which has a rapidly growing lifetime annuities market, the
government effectively underwrites annuity providers which therefore have no incentive to hedge
their longevity risk exposure.10
3. Stakeholders in the Longevity Risk Transfer Market
3.1. Classes of Stakeholders
Figure 1 shows the participants in the longevity risk transfer market. In this section, we examine the
various classes of stakeholders in this market.
3.2. Hedgers
3.2.1. One natural class of stakeholders are hedgers, those who have a particular exposure to
longevity risk and wish to lay off that risk. For example, deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension funds and
annuity providers stand to lose if mortality improves by more than anticipated, while life insurance
9 Richard Gluyas (2017) Challenger rides tidal wave of Japanese interest in Australian annuities, The
Weekend Australian, 24 April: ‘sales of Australian dollar annuities in Japan are estimated to be worth about
$A30 billion a year – about seven times the size of the entire annuities market in Australia’.
10 See Zelenko (2014)
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Figure 1. Participants in the Longevity Risk Transfer Market
Source: Adapted from Loeys et al. (2007, Chart 10); PPF, Pension Protection Fund, PBGC,
Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation.
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companies stand to gain, and vice versa. These offsetting exposures imply that annuity providers and
life assurers, for example, can hedge each other’s longevity risks.11 Alternatively, parties with
unwanted exposure to longevity risk might pay other parties to lay off some of their risk. For instance,
a life ofﬁce might hedge its longevity risk using a reinsurer or by selling it to capital market institutions.
3.2.2. As another possibility, pharmaceutical companies beneﬁt if people live longer, since they (and
the health service) need to spend more on medicines as they get older, especially for those in poor
health. Also there is a continuous stream of new medical treatments that prolong life. The phar-
maceutical companies could potentially issue longevity-linked debt to ﬁnance their research and
development programmes which, if sufﬁciently attractive for pension funds to hold, could be issued
at a lower cost than conventional ﬁxed maturity debt. In other words, pharmaceutical companies
beneﬁt if longevity increases and could put on a counterbalancing position by issuing longevity
bonds.12 While they have been approached about this possibility, no pharmaceutical company has
yet issued such debt. The principal reasons appear to be that the ﬁnance directors have not been
made sufﬁciently aware of the potential beneﬁts of such an issue – and in any case are more
concerned that the millions of dollars being spent on drug trials will bring a sufﬁcient return to
shareholders – and because, in practice, the short-term correlation between company proﬁts and
longevity is probably not strong enough to persuade ﬁnance directors to issue longevity bonds.
3.3. Specialist and General Investors
There are specialist investors in this market, such as life settlement13 investors, premium ﬁnance inves-
tors,14 and insurance-linked securities (ILS) investors.15 Depending on their existing exposures, these
investors could either buy longevity protection or sell it and earn a premium. General investors include
short-term investors, such as hedge funds and private equity investors and long-term investors, such as
sovereign wealth funds, endowments and family ofﬁces. Provided expected returns are acceptable, such
investors might be interested in acquiring an exposure to longevity risk, since it has a low correlation
with standard ﬁnancial market risk factors. The combination of a low beta and a potentially positive
alpha should therefore make mortality-linked securities attractive investments in diversiﬁed portfolios.
3.4. Speculators and Arbitrageurs
A market in longevity-linked securities might attract speculators: short-term investors who trade
their views on the direction of individual security price movements. The active involvement of
speculators is important for creating market liquidity as a by-product of their trading activities, and
is in fact essential to the success of traded futures and options markets. However, liquidity also
11 In many cases, annuity providers and life assurers are part of the same life ofﬁce, in which case the annuity
and life books provide at least a partial ‘natural hedge’.
12 This possibility was ﬁrst suggested in Dowd (2003).
13 A life settlement is the US name for a traded life policy.
14 Premium ﬁnance investors provide funding for those wishing to buy life settlements and similar types of
policies.
15 Insurance-linked securities are ﬁnancial instruments whose values depend typically on the occurrence of
prescribed high severity, low probability insurance loss events. The typical events covered are natural cata-
strophes, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, and the values of the ILSs will depend on the value of the property
losses if such events occur. ILSs are commonly known as catastrophe or CAT bonds.
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depends on the frequency with which new information about the market materialises and this is
currently sufﬁciently low that there is negligible speculator interest in the longevity market at the
present time. Arbitrageurs seek to proﬁt from any pricing anomalies in related securities. For
arbitrage to be a successful activity, it is essential that there are well-established pricing relationships
between the related securities: periodically, prices get out of line which creates proﬁt opportunities
which arbitrageurs exploit.16 However, the longevity market is currently not sufﬁciently well
developed for arbitrage opportunities to exist.
3.5. Governments
3.5.1. Governments havemany potential reasons to be interested in markets for longevity-linked securities.
Theymight wish to promote suchmarkets and assist ﬁnancial institutions that are exposed to longevity risk
(e.g. they might issue longevity bonds that can be used as instruments to hedge longevity risk).17
3.5.2. Governments might also be interested in managing their own exposure to longevity risk. They
are a signiﬁcant holder of this risk in their own right via pay-as-you-go state pensions, pensions to
former public sector employees and their obligations to provide health care for the elderly. At a
higher level, governments are affected by numerous other economic factors, some of which partially
offset their own exposure to longevity risk (for example income tax on private pensions continues to
be paid as people live longer).
3.6. Regulators
3.6.1. Financial regulators have two main stated aims: (i) the enhancement of ﬁnancial stability
through the promotion of efﬁcient, orderly and fair markets and (ii) ensuring that retail customers
get a fair deal.18 The two ﬁnancial regulators in the UK responsible for delivering on these aims are
the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).
3.6.2. The PRA has a duty to ensure that the ﬁnancial system is protected against systemic risks
and longevity risk is a potential example of such a risk. This, in turn, requires that carriers of
such risks, such as life insurance companies, issue sufﬁcient regulatory capital to protect them-
selves from insolvency with a high degree of probability. The FCA’s duty is to ensure that
customers get competitive and fairly priced annuity products, for example, and that becomes
more difﬁcult if providers of these products cannot easily or economically hedge the longevity
risk contained in them.19
16 Classic examples are currencies and commodities, such as gold, which are traded in two different markets
at different prices. Arbitrageurs will buy in the cheaper market and immediately sell in the dearer market, making
an arbitrage proﬁt if the price difference exceeds any transaction costs. The key difference between arbitrageurs
and speculators is that the former seek to make a proﬁt without taking on any risks (or at least minimising the
risks they need to take), whereas the latter seek to make a proﬁt from explicitly assuming risks.
17 As proposed in Blake et al. (2014).
18 As speciﬁed in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
19 Hedging allows the issuer of an annuity to reduce its exposure to longevity risk which in turn allows it to
offer its products at more competitive prices (i.e., closer to the actuarially fair price), since less regulatory capital
needs to be posted.
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3.6.3. Another interested regulator is The Pensions Regulator (TPR) which acts as gatekeeper to the
UK’s pension lifeboat, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).20 TPR wants to reduce the probability that
large companies (in particular) are bankrupted by their pension funds (Harrison & Blake, 2016). As
“insurer of last resort,” the Government is also potentially the residual holder of this risk in the event
of default by the PPF. The PPF and Government have a strong incentive to help companies hedge
their exposure to longevity risk, which would reduce the likelihood of claims on the PPF. The PPF
faces the systematic risk that longevity projections go up generally for plans (without diversifying
away between plans), which (i) pushes some plans into the PPF and (ii) increases existing PPF
liabilities.21
3.7. Other Stakeholders
Other domestic stakeholders include healthcare providers and insurers, providers of equity release
(or reverse or lifetime) mortgages and securities managers and organised exchanges, all of which
would beneﬁt from a new source of fee income. Members of both DB and deﬁned contribution (DC)
plans have an interest in protecting their current and future pension entitlements, although the risks
in the two types of plan are different. In the case of DB, the security of the plan itself is at stake, with
the member facing the risk of lower (e.g. PPF) beneﬁts if the plan sponsor becomes insolvent. In the
case of DC, the member is exposed either to the vagaries of the individual annuities market or to the
risk of drawing down beneﬁts too quickly and surviving longer than expected. Finally, individuals
with state pensions are ultimately not immune from increases in the government’s budget deﬁcit that
arise from increases in life expectancy: (i) state pensions could fall (in real terms) for current pen-
sioners, (ii) the state pension age could increase even further than currently planned for future
pensioners and (iii) all current and future generations of tax payers are ultimately liable for the
increased cost. Longevity risk is a global phenomenon, so there will be similar stakeholders in other
countries where this problem is prevalent.
4. Successful Insurance-Based Solutions
4.1. Overview
The traditional solution for dealing with unwanted longevity risk in a DB pension plan or an annuity
book is to sell the liability via an insurance or reinsurance contract. This is known as a pension buy-
out (or pension termination) or, in an insurance context, a group/bulk annuity transfer. More
recently, pension buy-ins and longevity insurance (the insurance term for a longevity swap) have been
added to the list of insurance-based solutions for transferring longevity risk. Insurance solutions are
generally classiﬁed as “customised indemniﬁcation solutions,” since the insurer fully indemniﬁes the
hedger against its speciﬁc risk exposure. These solutions can also be thought of as “at-the-money”
20 A statutory fund established by the UK Pensions Act 2004 “to provide compensation to members of
eligible deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, when there is a qualifying insolvency event in relation to the employer, and
where there are insufﬁcient assets in the pension plan to cover the Pension Protection Fund level of
compensation.”
21 The same would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the US equivalent of the PPF, namely the Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
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hedges, since the hedge provider is responsible for any increase in the liability above the current best
estimate assumption on a pound-for-pound basis.
4.2. Pension Buy-outs
4.2.1. The most common traditional solution for DB pension plans is a full pension buy-out,
implemented by a regulated life assurer. The procedure can be illustrated using the following simple
example.
4.2.2. Consider Company ABC with pension plan assets (A) of 85 and pension plan liabilities (L) of
100, valued on an “ongoing basis”22 by the plan actuary; this implies a deﬁcit of 15. ABC
approaches life assurer XYZ to effect a pension buy-out. On a full “buy-out basis,” the insurer
values the pension liabilities at 120, a premium of 20 to the plan actuary’s valuation, implying a buy-
out deﬁcit of 35. The insurer, subject to due diligence, offers to take on both the plan assets A and
plan liabilities L provided the company contributes 35 from its own resources (or from borrowing)
to cover the buy-out deﬁcit. Following the acquisition, the insurer implements an asset transition
plan which involves exchanging certain assets, e.g. cash or equities for bonds or loans, and imple-
menting interest rate and inﬂation swaps to hedge the interest-rate and inﬂation risk associated with
the pension liabilities.23
4.2.3. The advantages to the company are that the pension liabilities are completely removed from its
balance sheet. In the case where the company does not have the cash resources to pay the full cost of
the buy-out, the pension deﬁcit (on a buy-out basis) is often replaced by a loan which, unlike
ﬂuctuating pension liabilities, is an obligation that is readily understood by investment analysts and
shareholders. The company avoids volatility in its proﬁt and loss account coming from the pension
plan,24 the payment of levies to the PPF, administration fees on the plan and the potential drag on its
enterprise value arising from the pension plan. The advantage of a buy-out to the pension trustees
and plan members is that pensions are now secured in full (subject to the credit risk of the life
assurer).
4.2.4. There is a potential disadvantage in terms of timing. Once a buy-out has taken place, it cannot
generally be renegotiated if circumstances change and the buy-out price is lower in the future, say,
because an increase in long-term interest rates leads to the discount rate used to value pension
liabilities also increasing. There is also a potential risk that the buy-out company itself becomes
insolvent in which case the pensioners would have no recourse to the PPF. However, since buy-out
22 In the UK, this would be consistent with Section 28 of FRS 102 (The Financial Reporting Standard
applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland) or the International Accounting Standard IAS 19.
23 Traditional UK insurers running annuity books interpret UK regulatory capital requirements as restricting
them to invest in government and investment-grade corporate bonds and related derivatives.
24 This volatility is generated by the way in which accounting standards treat DB pension liabilities in a
market-consistent way as the present discounted value of projected future pension payments. The required
discount rates are related to the market yield on a class of traded bonds (such as AA-rated corporate bonds) of
appropriate term. If market conditions are such that this yield is volatile, then the value of the pension liabilities
will be similarly volatile, even though the projected stream of future pension payments might have changed very
little. Further, if the loan has a shorter duration than the pension cashﬂows, it will have a lower balance sheet
sensitivity to interest rate changes.
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companies are established as insurance companies with solvency capital requirements,25 this risk
should, in practice, be very low in countries like the UK.
4.3. Pension Buy-ins
4.3.1. Buy-ins are insurance transactions that involve the bulk purchase of annuities by the pension
plan to hedge the risks associated with a subset of the plan’s liabilities, typically associated with
retired members. The annuities become an asset of the plan and cover the speciﬁc mortality char-
acteristics of the plan’s membership in terms of age, gender and pension amount – but the individual
members do not receive annuity certiﬁcates.
4.3.2. Buy-ins are often part of the journey to a full buy-out. They can be thought of as providing a
“de-risking” of the pension plan in economic terms. If purchased in phases, they enable the plan to
smooth out annuity rates over time and avoid a spike in pricing at the time it decides to proceed
directly to a full buy-out. Buy-ins also offer the sponsor the advantage of full immunisation of a
portion of the pension liabilities for a lower up-front cash payment relative to a full buy-out –
although the recent introduction of deferred premium payments for both buy-ins and buy-outs has
helped to spread costs for both types of product.26
4.3.3. Since the annuity contract purchased in a buy-in is an asset of the pension plan, rather than an
asset of the plan member, the pension liability remains on the balance sheet of the sponsor. Plan
members are therefore still exposed to the risk of sponsor insolvency if the plan is in deﬁcit and
(indirectly) to the risk of insurance company insolvency unless the buy-in deal has been fully
collateralised.
4.4. Longevity Insurance or Insurance-Based Longevity Swaps
4.4.1. The third successful solution is the longevity insurance contract or insurance-based longevity
swap. This is effectively an insurance version of the capital-markets-based longevity swap (discussed
in the next section), which transfers longevity risk only.27 A typical structure involves the buyer of
the swap paying a pre-agreed ﬁxed set of cash ﬂows to the swap provider and receiving in exchange a
ﬂoating set of cash ﬂows linked to the realised mortality experience of the swap buyer, the latter
being used to pay the pensions for which the swap buyer is liable. No assets are transferred and the
pension plan typically retains the investment risks associated with the asset portfolio. Longevity
swaps have the advantage that they remove longevity risk without the need for an upfront payment
by the sponsor and allow the pension plan trustees to retain control of the asset allocation.
4.4.2. The ﬁrst publicly announced longevity swap took place in April 2007 between Swiss Re and
Friends’ Provident, a UK life insurer. It was a pure longevity risk transfer and was not tied to another
25 See section 7.2 for more details.
26 See paragraph 11.52.
27 It is important to note that contingent beneﬁciaries would also be covered by the swap and so marital status
and spouse age risks would be passed on. Additional data on these would be sought at the time of seeking cover,
e.g. by writing to members and asking them if they are married and, if so, the age of the spouse. But divorce and
remarriage can still occur before the spouse pension comes into payment.
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ﬁnancial instrument or transaction. The swap was based on Friends’ Provident’s £1.7bn book of
78,000 pension annuity contracts written between July 2001 and December 2006. Friends’ Provident
retains administration of policies. Swiss Re makes payments and assumes longevity risk in exchange
for an undisclosed premium.
4.4.3. In any longevity swap, the hedger of longevity risk (e.g. a pension plan or insurer) receives
from the longevity swap provider the actual payments28 it must pay to pensioners and, in return,
makes a series of ﬁxed payments to the hedge provider.29 In this way, if pensioners live longer than
expected, the higher pension amounts that the pension plan must pay are offset by the higher
payments received from the provider of the longevity swap. The swap therefore provides the pension
plan with a long-maturity, customised cash ﬂow hedge of its longevity risk.
4.4.4. Figure 2 shows the set of cash ﬂows in a typical longevity swap involving a pension plan
wishing to hedge its longevity risk exposure. The plan makes a set of pre-agreed ﬁxed payments (each
payment is based on an amount-weighted survival rate (Dowd et al., 2006; Dawson et al., 2010))
and receives the actual pension payments it needs to make (these will be based on its realised
longevity experience).
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Figure 2. A longevity swap involves the regular exchange of actual realised pension cash ﬂows
and pre-agreed ﬁxed cash ﬂows
Source: Coughlan (2007a).
28 Before the swap is implemented, it is common to simplify beneﬁts where possible, e.g. by reducing the
overall number of pension increase tranches, simplifying partial payments in month of death, and, in a UK
context, simplifying what happens when the pensioner passes GMP age. (Between April 1978 and April 1997,
members of UK contracted-out pension plans accrued a notional SERPS (State Earnings Related Pension Scheme)
pension which is called the Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP). The GMP was originally payable from age 60
for women and age 65 for men, although European Union equality legislation requires plans to introduce equal
treatment for men and women in their plans in respect of the GMP.)
29 It is possible that the swap is set up to cover inﬂation increases (possibly up to a limit), in which case the
ﬁxed payments are ﬁxed in real rather than in nominal terms.
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5. Successful Capital Markets Solutions
5.1. Overview
In this section, we analyse the small number of capital market securities that have been successfully
launched since 2006: longevity-spread bonds, longevity swaps, q-forwards, S-forwards and tail-risk
protection (or longevity bull call spreads). The key feature of these is that most are index rather than
customised solutions.30
5.2. Longevity-Spread Bonds
5.2.1. In December 2010, Swiss Re issued an 8-year catastrophe-type bond linked to longevity
spreads. To do this, it used a special purpose vehicle, Kortis Capital, based in the Cayman Islands.31
The Kortis bond is designed to hedge Swiss Re’s own exposure to longevity risk.32 It had a very small
nominal value of just $50m, which clearly meant that it was designed to test the water for a new type
of capital market instrument.
5.2.2. The bond holders received quarterly coupons equal to 3-month LIBOR plus a margin. In
exchange, they were exposed to the risk that the difference between the annualised mortality
improvement in English & Welsh males aged 75–85 over a period of 8 years and the corresponding
improvement in US males aged 55–65 is signiﬁcantly larger than anticipated. The mortality
improvements were measured over 8 years from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2016. The bonds
matured on 15 January 2017,33 although there was an option to extend the maturity to 15 July
2019. The principal was at risk if the Longevity Divergence Index Value (LDIV) exceeded the
attachment point or trigger level of 3.4% over the risk period. The exhaustion point, at or above
which there would be no return of principal, is 3.9%. The principal would be reduced by the
principal reduction factor (PRF) if the LDIV lies between 3.4% and 3.9%.
5.2.3. The LDIV is derived as follows. Let my(x,t) be the male death rate at age x and year t in
country y. This is deﬁned as the ratio of deaths to population size for the relevant age and year.
Annualised mortality improvements over n years are deﬁned as:
Improvementyn x; tð Þ=1
my x; tð Þ
my x; tnð Þ
 1
n
(1)
The annualised mortality improvement index for each age group is found by averaging the
annualised mortality improvements across ages x1 to x2 in the group:
Index yð Þ= 1
1 + x2x1
Xx= x2
x= x1
Improvementyn x; tð Þ (2)
30 The J. P. Morgan–Canada Life swap discussed in section 5.3 is one of the few examples of a customised
capital markets solution.
31 http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/Swiss_Re_completes_ﬁrst_longevity_trend_bond_transferring_
USD_50_million_of_longevity_trend_risk_to_the_capital_markets.html
32 It is important to recognise that the Kortis bond is not a true longevity bond in the sense that it hedges the
longevity trend in a particular population. Rather it transfers the risk associated with the spread (or difference)
between the longevity trends for two different population groups, rather than the trends themselves.
33 The payoff of the bond depends on population mortality data for 2016 for England & Wales (now
published) and the US (not yet published at the time of writing).
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In the case of the Kortis bond, n is equal to 8 years. The LDIV is deﬁned as:
LDIV = Index y2ð ÞIndex y1ð Þ (3)
where y2 is the England & Wales population aged 75–85 and y1 is the US population aged 55–65.
The PRF is calculated as follows:
PRF=
LDIVAttachment point
Exhaustion pointAttachment point (4)
with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 100%.
5.2.4. Proceeds from the sale of the bond were deposited in a collateral account at the AAA-rated
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (i.e. the World Bank). If there is a larger-
than-expected difference between the mortality improvements of 75–85 year old English & Welsh
males and those of 55–65 year old US males, part of the collateral will be sold to make payment to
Swiss Re and, as a consequence, the principal of the bond would be reduced. The exposure that Swiss
Re wished to hedge comes from two different sources. For example, Swiss Re is the counterparty in a
£750m longevity swap with the Royal County of Berkshire Pension Fund which was executed in
2009, and so is exposed to high-age English &Welsh males living longer than anticipated. It has also
reinsured a lot of US life insurance policies and is exposed to middle-aged US males dying sooner
than expected. The longevity-spread bond provided a partial hedge for both tail exposures.
5.2.5. Standard & Poor’s rated the bond BB+ which took into account the possibility that investors
would not receive the full return of their principal. This rating was determined using two models
developed by RMS which was appointed as the calculation agent for the bonds.34
5.2.6. Table 1 shows estimated loss probabilities for the bond using the RMS models. Figure 3
presents a fan chart of the projected LDIV showing the 98% conﬁdence interval.
5.2.7. This was the ﬁrst time that the risk of individuals living longer than expected has been traded
in the form of a bond. Investors had been reluctant to hold longevity risk long term, but short-term
bonds might make bearing the risk more acceptable. The bond therefore represented a signiﬁcant
Table 1. Estimated Loss Probabilities for the Swiss Re Longevity-Spread Bond
LDIV (%) PRF (%) Exceedance Probability (%)
3.4 0 5.31(1)
3.5 20 4.32
3.6 40 3.48
3.7 60 2.82
3.8 80 2.28
3.9 100 1.81(2)
Expected loss 3.27
Note: (1)attachment probability; (2)exhaustion probability.
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2010) Presale information: Kortis Capital Ltd. Tech. Report.
34 See section 9.4 for more details.
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breakthrough for capital market solutions. Nevertheless, there appears to have been very little
trading in the bond and no further examples of the bond have so far been issued.
5.3. Capital-Markets-Based Longevity Swaps
5.3.1. The ﬁrst capital-markets-based longevity swap took place in July 2008 between J. P. Morgan
and Canada Life in the UK (Trading Risk, 2008). The contract was a 40-year maturity £500m
longevity swap that was linked to the actual mortality experience of the 125,000-plus annuitants in
the annuity portfolio that was being hedged. This transaction brought capital markets investors into
the longevity market for the very ﬁrst time, as the longevity risk was passed from Canada Life to
J. P. Morgan and then directly on to investors.
5.3.2. This has become the archetypal longevity swap upon which other transactions are based.
Insurance companies, such as Rothesay Life, have adapted its structure and collateralisation terms to
an insurance format.
5.3.3. It is important to note that the J. P. Morgan – Canada Life swap was a customised swap, since
it was linked to the actual mortality experience of the hedger. All insurance-based longevity swaps in
the UK have also been customised swaps to date. However, such swaps are harder to price35 and are
potentially more illiquid than index-based swaps which are based on the mortality experience of a
reference population, such as the national population. Most longevity swaps sold into the capital
markets are index-based. These issues are discussed in more detail in section 8.
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Figure 3. Fan chart of the projected LDIV showing the 98% conﬁdence interval
Source: Hunt & Blake (2015, Figure 8).
35 Although pension plans tend to have good quality data in terms of pension amount, birth date, postcode
etc, they also tend to have less mortality experience data and have their own idiosyncratic socio-economic and
geodemographic characteristics that need careful assessment and calibration.
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5.4. q-Forwards (or Mortality Forwards) and S-Forwards (or Survivor
Forwards)
5.4.1. A mortality forward rate contract is referred to as a “q-forward” because the letter “q” is the
standard actuarial symbol for a mortality rate. It is the simplest type of instrument for hedging
longevity (and mortality) risk (Coughlan et al., 2007b).36,37
5.4.2. The ﬁrst capital markets transaction involving a q-forward took place in January 2008. The
hedger was buy-out company Lucida (Lucida, 2008; Symmons, 2008). The q-forward was linked to
a longevity index based on England & Wales national male mortality for a range of different ages.
The hedge was provided by J. P. Morgan and was novel not just because it involved a longevity index
and a new kind of product, but also because it was designed as a hedge of value rather than a hedge
of cash ﬂow. In other words, it hedged the value of an annuity liability,38 not the actual individual
annuity payments.
5.4.3. Formally, a q-forward is a contract between two parties in which they agree to exchange an
amount proportional to the actual realised mortality rate of a given population (or sub-population),
in return for an amount proportional to a ﬁxed mortality rate that has been mutually agreed at
inception to be payable at a future date (the maturity of the contract). In this sense, a q-forward is a
swap that exchanges ﬁxed mortality for the realised mortality at maturity, as illustrated in Figure 4.
The variable used to settle the contract is the realised mortality rate for that population in a future
period. In the case of hedging longevity risk in a pension plan using a q-forward, the plan will receive
the ﬁxed mortality rate and pay the realised mortality rate (and hence, over the term of the contract,
locks in the future mortality rate it has to pay whatever happens to actual rates). The counterparty to
this transaction, typically an investment bank, has the opposite exposure, paying the ﬁxed mortality
rate and receiving the realised rate.
5.4.4. The ﬁxed mortality rate at which the transaction takes place deﬁnes the “forward mortality
rate” for the population in question. If the q-forward is fairly priced, no payment changes hands at
the inception of the trade, but at maturity, a net payment will be made by one of the two parties
(unless the ﬁxed and actual mortality rates happen to be the same). The settlement that takes place at
maturity is based on the net amount payable and is proportional to the difference between the ﬁxed
mortality rate (the transacted forward rate) and the realised reference rate. If the reference rate in the
Pension
Plan
Hedge
Provider
Amount  x
realized mortality rate
Amount x
fixed mortality rate
Figure 4. A q-forward exchanges ﬁxed mortality for realised mortality at the maturity of the contract
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Figure 1)
36 See also: http://www.llma.org/ﬁles/documents/Technical_Note_q_Forward_Final.pdf; http://www.llma.
org/ﬁles/documents/SampleTermSheet_-_q-Forward_Final.pdf; http://www.llma.org/ﬁles/documents/q-forward_
Example_Sheet_Version_Update.xlsm
37 Although q-forwards are simple in concept, using them can be complex and multi-population modelling is
essential (see paragraph 9.3.1).
38 Or a signiﬁcant part of it, if not fully.
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reference year is below the ﬁxed rate (implying lower mortality than predicted), then the settlement is
positive, and the pension plan receives the settlement payment to offset the increase in its liability
value. If, on the other hand, the reference rate is above the ﬁxed rate (implying higher mortality than
predicted), then the settlement is negative and the pension plan makes the settlement payment to the
hedge provider, which will be offset by the fall in the value of its liabilities. In this way, the net
liability value is hedged39 regardless of what happens to mortality rates. The plan is protected from
unexpected changes in mortality rates.
5.4.5. Table 2 presents an illustrative term sheet for a q-forward transaction, based on a reference
population of 65-year-old males from England & Wales. The q-forward payout depends on the
value of the LifeMetrics Index for the reference population on the maturity date of the contract. The
particular transaction shown is a 10-year q-forward contract starting on 31 December 2008 and
maturing on 31 December 2018. It is being used by ABC Pension Fund to hedge its longevity risk
over this period; the hedge provider is J. P. Morgan. The hedge is a “directional hedge” and will help
the pension fund hedge its longevity risk so long as the mortality experience of the pension fund and
the index change in the same direction.
5.4.6. On the maturity date, J. P. Morgan (the ﬁxed-rate payer or seller of longevity risk protection)
pays ABC Pension Fund (the ﬂoating-rate payer or buyer of longevity risk protection) an amount
related to the pre-agreed ﬁxed mortality rate of 1.2000% (i.e. the agreed forward mortality rate for
65-year-old English & Welsh males for 2018). In return, ABC Pension Fund pays J. P. Morgan an
amount related to the reference rate on the maturity date. The reference rate is the most recently
available value of the LifeMetrics Index. Settlement on 31 December 2018 will therefore be based on
the LifeMetrics Index value for the reference year 2017, on account of the 10-month lag in the
availability of ofﬁcial data. The settlement amount is the difference between the ﬁxed amount (which
depends on the agreed forward rate) and the ﬂoating amount (which depends on the realised
reference rate).
Table 2. An Illustrative Term Sheet for a Single q-forward to Hedge Longevity Risk
Notional Amount GBP 50,000,000
Trade date 31 December 2008
Effective date 31 December 2008
Maturity date 31 December 2018
Reference year 2017
Fixed rate 1.2000%
Fixed amount payer J. P. Morgan
Fixed amount Notional amount × ﬁxed rate × 100
Reference rate LifeMetrics graduated initial mortality rate for 65-year-old males in the reference year for
England & Wales national population
Bloomberg ticker: LMQMEW65 Index <GO>
Floating amount payer ABC Pension Fund
Floating amount Notional amount × reference rate × 100
Settlement Net settlement=ﬁxed amount – ﬂoating amount
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Table 1).
39 Or a signiﬁcant part of it, if not fully.
D. Blake et al.
16
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321718000314
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 25 Feb 2019 at 20:02:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
5.4.7. Table 3 shows the settlement amounts for four realised values of the reference rate and a
notional contract size of £50m. If the reference rate in 2017 is lower than the ﬁxed rate (implying
lower mortality than anticipated at the start of the contract), the settlement amount is positive and
ABC Pension Fund receives a payment from J. P. Morgan that it can use to offset an increase in its
pension liabilities. If the reference rate exceeds the ﬁxed rate (implying higher mortality than
anticipated at the start of the contract), the settlement amount is negative and ABC Pension Fund
makes a payment to J. P. Morgan which will be offset by a fall in its pension liabilities.
5.4.8. It is important to note that the hedge illustrated here is structured as a “value hedge,” rather
than as a “cash ﬂow hedge.” A value hedge aims to hedge the value of the hedger’s liabilities at the
maturity date of the swap. So although the swap has a duration of only 10 years, it nevertheless
hedges that portion of the longevity risk in the hedger’s cash ﬂows beyond 10 years that are reﬂected
in mortality rates at time 10. This is achieved by exchanging a single payment at maturity. By
contrast, a cash ﬂow hedge hedges the longevity risk in each one of the hedger’s cash ﬂows and net
payments are made period by period as in Figure 2. The J. P. Morgan-Canada Life longevity swap is
an example of a cash ﬂow hedge, while the J. P. Morgan-Lucida q-forward is an example of a value
hedge. The capital markets are more familiar with value hedges, whereas cash ﬂow hedges are more
common in the insurance world. Value hedges are particularly suited to hedging the longevity risk of
younger members of a pension plan, since it is much harder to estimate with precision the pension
payments they will receive when they eventually retire. The world’s ﬁrst swap for non-pensioners (i.e.
involving deferred members) took place in January 2011 when J. P. Morgan executed a value hedge
in the form of a 10-year q-forward contract with the Pall (UK) pension fund.
5.4.9. The importance of q-forwards rests in the fact that they form basic building blocks from which
other more complex, life-related derivatives can be constructed. When appropriately designed, a
portfolio of q-forwards can be used to replicate and to hedge the longevity exposure of an annuity or
a pension liability, or to hedge the mortality exposure of a life assurance book. We now provide an
example.
5.4.10. A series of q-forward contracts, with different ages and maturities, can be combined to hedge
a longevity swap. Initially assume that there is a complete market in these contracts for all ages and
maturities. Suppose the contract involves swapping at time t a ﬁxed cashﬂow, ~SðtÞ, for the realised
survivor index, S(t,x), where x is the age of the group being hedged at the inception of the swap. The
ﬁxed leg can be hedged using zero-coupon ﬁxed-income bonds. The ﬂoating leg can be hedged
approximately as follows. First, note that we can approximate the survivor index by expanding the
Table 3. An Illustration of q-Forward Settlement for Various Outcomes of the Realised Reference Rate
Reference Rate
(Realised Rate) (%) Fixed Rate (%)
Notional
(GBP)
Settlement
(GBP)
1.0000 1.2000 50,000,000 10,000,000
1.1000 1.2000 50,000,000 5,000,000
1.2000 1.2000 50,000,000 0
1.3000 1.2000 50,000,000 − 5,000,000
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007b, Table 1): A positive (negative) settlement means the hedger pays (receives) the net
settlement amount.
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cashﬂow in terms of the ﬁxed legs of a set of q-forwards and their ultimate net payoffs (see Cairns
et al., 2008):
S t; xð Þ= 1q 0; xð Þð Þ ´ 1q 1; x + 1ð Þð Þ ´ ::: ´ 1q t1; x + t1ð Þð Þ
=
Yt1
i= 0
1qF 0; i; x + ið ÞΔ i; x + ið Þð Þ

Yt1
i=0
1qF 0; i; x + ið Þð Þ

Xt1
i=0
Δ i; x + ið Þ
Yt1
j= 0;j≠ i
1qF 0; j; x + jð Þð Þ
where Δ(i, x + i)=q(i, x + i)− qF(0, i, x + i) and qF(0, i, x + i)= q-forward mortality rate (the ﬁxed
rate). Here, Δ(i, x + i) is the net payoff on the q-forward per unit at time i + 1.
5.4.11. It follows that an approximate hedge (assuming interest rates are constant and equal to r per
annum) for S(t, x) can be achieved by holding:
∙  1 + rð Þðt1ÞQt1j=0; j≠ 1 1qF 0; j; x + jð Þð Þ units of the 1-year q-forward;
∙  1 + rð Þðt2ÞQt1j=0; j≠ 1 1qF 0; j; x + jð Þð Þ units of the 2-year q-forward;
∙ …
∙ Qt1j=0; j≠ t1 1qF 0; j; x + jð Þð Þ units of the t-year q-forward.
5.4.12. In calculating these hedge quantities, we take account of the fact that, for example, the payoff at
time 1 on the 1-year q-forward will be rolled up to time t at the risk-free rate of interest. Hence, the
required payoff at time t needs to be multiplied by the discount factor (1 + r)− (t−1). In a stochastic interest
environment, a quanto derivative would be required. This is one that delivers a number of units, N, of a
speciﬁed asset, whereN is derived from a reference index that is different from the asset being delivered. In
this context,N equals Δ i; x + ið ÞQt1j=0; j≠ i 1qF 0; j; x + jð Þð Þ, and we deliver, at time i+1,N units of the
ﬁxed-interest zero-coupon bond maturing at time t, with a price P(i + 1,t) at time i + 1 per unit.
5.4.13. In the real world, a complete market in q-forward contracts does not exist and the hedge
would have to be constructed from q-forward contracts with a more limited range of reference ages
(e.g. 10-year age buckets) and maturities (e.g. out to 20 years at most). Nevertheless, the complete
market hedge serves as a benchmark against which we can measure the effectiveness of hedges using
a smaller number of q-forwards.
5.4.14. A related contract is the “S-forward” or “survivor” forward contract, which is based on the
survivor index, S(t, x), which itself is derived from the more fundamental mortality rates. An
“S-forward” is the basic building block of a longevity (survivor) swap ﬁrst discussed in Dowd (2003).
A longevity swap is composed of a stream of S-forwards with different maturity dates. It could be used,
for example, for covering early cashﬂows, in conjunction with a q-forward at time 10 to (partially)
cover the later cashﬂows.40
40 See also: http://www.llma.org/ﬁles/documents/Technical_Note_S_Forward_Final.pdf; http://www.llma.
org/ﬁles/documents/SampleTermSheet_-_S-Forward_Final.pdf; http://www.llma.org/ﬁles/documents/S-forward_
Example_Sheet_Version_Update.xlsm
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5.5. Tail-Risk Protection (or Longevity Bull Call Spread)
5.5.1. To date there have been at least ﬁve publicly announced deals involving tail risk protection.
The ﬁrst two involved Aegon: one in 2012 was executed by Deutsche Bank and another in 2013 by
Société Générale. The second two involved Delta Lloyd and Reinsurance Group of America (RGA
Re) in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The most recent occurred in December 2017 between NN Life
and Hannover Re and is similar to the Société Générale deal discussed below.
5.5.2. Société Générale’s tail risk protection structure was described in Michaelson & Mulholland
(2014).41 It is an index-based hedge using national population mortality data, but with minimal basis
risk,42 and is designed around the following set of principles (pp.30–31):
In general, capital markets will be most effective in providing capital against the most remote
pieces of longevity risk, called tail risk. This can be accomplished by creating “out-of-the-
money” hedges against extreme longevity outcomes featuring option-like payouts that will
occur if certain predeﬁned thresholds are breached. These hedges would be capable of
alleviating certain capital requirements to which the (re)insurers are subject, thereby enabling
additional risk assumption.
However, a well-constructed hedge programme must perform a delicate balancing act to be
effective. On the one hand, it must provide an exposure that sufﬁciently mimics the perform-
ance of the underlying portfolio so as not to introduce unacceptable amounts of basis risk;
while, on the other hand, it must simplify the modelling and underwriting process to a level that
is manageable by a broad base of investors. Further, the hedge transaction must compress the
60+ year duration of the underlying retirement obligations to an investment horizon that is
appealing to institutional investors.
5.5.3. Basis risk will reduce hedge effectiveness and this will, in turn, reduce the allowable regulatory
capital relief.43 However, basis risk with this product can be minimised if the hedger can customise
three features of the hedge exposure:
∙ The hedger is able to select the age and gender of the “cohorts” (also known as model points) they
want in the reference exposure. For example, the hedger selects an exposure totalling 70 cohorts –
males and females aged 65–99 – to cover all the retired lives in the pension plan.
Table 4. Exposure Vector: Relative Weighting of Cohorts Over Time
Cohort Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 … Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 … Year 54 Year 55
Male 65 1000 995 985 … 590 565 535 … 65 55
Male 66 980 975 960 … 505 485 450 … 45 40
… … … … … … … … … … …
Female 99 125 120 115 … 20 10 5 … 0 0
Source: Michaelson & Mulholland (2014, Exhibit 1).
41 See, also, Cairns & El Boukfaoui (2018) for a more detailed description.
42 See section 6.3.
43 See section 7.2.
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∙ The hedger is able to choose the “exposure vector,” i.e. the “relative weighting” of each cohort
over time. This will equal the anticipated annuity payments for each cohort in each year of the risk
period (see Table 4 for an example).
∙ The hedger is able to select an “experience ratio matrix,” based on an experience study of its
underlying book of business. For each cohort, in each year of the risk period, a ﬁxed adjustment is
applied to the national-population mortality rate to adjust for anticipated differences between the
mortality proﬁle of the hedger’s book of business and the corresponding reference population. So
if the hedger’s underlying lives are healthier than the general population, they will assign
experience ratios of less than 100% to “scale down” the mortality rate applied in the payout (see
Table 5 for an example).
5.5.4. A risk exposure period of 55 years – as shown in Tables 4 and 5 – is unattractive to capital
markets investors for a number of reasons. Liquidity in this market is still low and would
be completely absent at these horizons. The maximum effective investment horizon is no more than
15 years. Just as important, the risks are too great. The likely advances in medical science suggest
that the range of outcomes for longevity experience will be very wide for an investment horizon of
more than half a century.
5.5.5. To accommodate both an “exposure period” of 55 years or more and a “risk period” (or
transaction length) of 15 years, the hedge programme uses a “commutation function” to “compress”
the risk period. As explained in Michaelson & Mulholland (2014, pp. 32–33):
This is accomplished by basing the ﬁnal index calculations on the combination of two
elements: (i) the actual mortality experience, as published by the national statistical reporting
agency, applied to the exposure deﬁned for the risk period; and (ii) the present value of the
remaining exposure at the end of the risk period calculated using a “re-parameterised”
longevity model that takes into account the realised mortality experience over the life of the
transaction. This re-parameterisation process involves:
∙ Selecting an appropriate longevity risk model and establishing the initial parameterisation of the
model using publicly available historical mortality data that exist as of the trade date. For a basic
longevity model, the parameters that may be established, on a cohort-by-cohort basis, are (i) the
current rate of mortality; (ii) the expected path of mortality improvement; and (iii) the variability
in the expected path of mortality improvement.
∙ “Freezing” the longevity risk model, with regard to the related structure; but also deﬁning, in
advance, an objective process for updating the model’s parameters based on the additional
mortality experience that will be reported over the risk period. A determination needs to be made
Table 5. Experience Ratio Matrix
Cohort Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 … Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 … Year 54 Year 55
Male 65 90% 89% 88% … 81% 80% 80% … 75% 75%
Male 66 89% 88% 87% … 80% 79% 79% … 75% 75%
… … … … … … … … … … …
Female 99 77% 77% 76% … 75% 75% 75% … 75% 75%
Source: Michaelson & Mulholland (2014, Exhibit 2).
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as to which parameters are subject to updating, as well as the relative importance that will be
placed on the historical data versus the data received during the risk period.
∙ Re-parameterising the longevity model by incorporating the additional mortality data reported
over the life of the trade. This occurs at the end of the transaction risk period, once the mortality
data for the ﬁnal year in the risk period have been received.
∙ Calculating the present value of the remaining exposure using the re-parameterised version of the
initial longevity model. This is done by projecting future mortality rates, either stochastically or
deterministically, and then discounting the cash ﬂows using forward rates determined at the
inception of the transaction.
5.5.6. The beneﬁt of this approach to the hedger is that “roll risk”44 is reduced, since, by taking
account of actual mortality rates over the risk period, there will be a much more reliable estimate at
the end of the risk period of the expected net present value of the remaining exposure than if only
historical mortality rates prior to the risk period were used. The beneﬁt to the investor is that the
longevity model is known and not subject to change, so the only source of cash ﬂow uncertainty in
the hedge is the realisation of national population mortality rates over the risk period – see Figure 5.
5.5.7. The hedge itself is structured using a long out-of-the money call option bull spread on future
mortality outcomes. The spread has two strike prices or, using insurance terminology, an attachment
point and an exhaustion point.45 These strikes are deﬁned relative to the distribution of “ﬁnal index
values” calculated using the agreed longevity model. The ﬁnal index value will be a combination of:
∙ The “actual” mortality experience of the hedger throughout the risk period which is calculated by
applying the reported national population mortality rates to the predeﬁned “exposure vector” and
“experience ratio matrix” for each cohort in each year of the risk period, and accumulating with
interest, using forward interest rates deﬁned on the trade date.
Figure 5. Mortality rates before, during and after the risk period
Note: Projected mortality rates are calculated using experience data available at end of the risk
period. Source: Michaelson & Mulholland (2014, Exhibit 3).
44 This is the risk that arises when a hedger is not able for some reason to put on a single hedge that covers the
full term of its risk exposure and is forced to use a sequence of shorter term hedges which are rolled over when
each hedge matures, with the risk that the next hedge in the sequence is set up on less favourable terms than the
previous one.
45 The spread is constructed using a long call at the lower strike price and a short call at the upper strike price.
Still living with mortality
21
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321718000314
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 25 Feb 2019 at 20:02:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
∙ The “commutation calculation” that estimates the expected net present value of the remaining
exposure at the end of the risk period, calculated using the re-parameterised version of the initial
longevity model.
5.5.8. Given the distribution of the ﬁnal index, the attachment and exhaustion points are selected to
maximise the hedger’s capital relief, taking into account the investors’ (i.e. risk takers’) wish to
maximise the premium for the risk level assumed. Investors might also demand a “minimum pre-
mium” to engage in the transaction. The intermediary – e.g. the investment bank – therefore needs to
carefully work out the optimal amount of risk transfer, given both the hedger’s strategic objectives
and investor preferences.
5.5.9. The hedger then needs to calculate the level of capital required to cover possible longevity out-
comes with a speciﬁed degree of conﬁdence. For example, if the “best estimate” of the longevity liability is
$1bn, the (re)insurer may actually be required to issue $1.2bn, $200m of which is reserve capital to cover
the potential increase in liability due to unanticipated longevity improvement with 99% conﬁdence.
5.5.10. The (re)insurer may then decide to implement a hedge transaction with a maximum payout
of $100m. This transaction would begin making a payment to the hedger in the event the attachment
point is breached, and then paying linearly up to $100m if the longevity outcome meets or exceeds
the exhaustion point. This hedge provides a form of “contingent capital” from investors (up to
$100m of the $200m required), enabling the hedger to reduce the amount of regulatory capital it
must issue – see Figure 6.
5.5.11. Tail risk protection was actually discussed in Living with Mortality in section 6.4 entitled
“Geared Longevity Bonds and Longevity Spreads,” which we reproduce here. The geared longevity
bond enables holders to increase hedging impact for any given capital outlay.
5.5.12. One way to construct such a bond would be as follows. Looking ahead from time 0, the
payment on each date t can in theory range from 0 to 1 (times the initial coupon). However, again
looking ahead from time 0, we can also suppose that the payment at time t (the survivor index, S(t,x);
see paragraph 5.4.10 above) is likely to fall within a much narrower band, say S(t, x)∈ [Sl(t), Su(t)].
For example, if we are using a stochastic mortality model we could let Sl(t) and Su(t) be the 2.5% and
Figure 6. Distribution of the ﬁnal index value and the potential for capital reduction
Source: Michaelson & Mulholland (2014, Exhibit 4) – not drawn to scale.
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97.5% percentiles of the simulated distribution of S(t, x). These simulated conﬁdence limits become
part of the contract speciﬁcation at time 0.
5.5.13. We now set up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) at time 0 that holds Su(t) − Sl(t) units of the
ﬁxed interest zero-coupon bond that matures at time t for each t=1,…,T (or its equivalent using
ﬂoating-rate debt and an interest-rate swap). Suppose the SPV is ﬁnanced by two investors A and B.
At time t, the SPV pays: (i) S(t,x)− Sl(t) to A with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of Su(t)− Sl(t); and
(ii) Su(t)− S(t,x) to B with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of Su(t)− Sl(t).
5.5.14. The minimum and maximum payouts at each time to A and B ensure that the payments are
always non-negative and can be ﬁnanced entirely from the proceeds of the ﬁxed-interest zero-coupon
bond holdings of the SPV.
5.5.15. The payoff at t to A can equivalently be written as
S t; xð ÞSlðtÞð Þ +max Sl tð ÞS t; xð Þ; 0f gmax S t; xð ÞSu tð Þ; 0f g
that is, a combination of a long forward contract, a long put option on S(t, x) (or a “ﬂoorlet,” with a
strike price that is lower than the at-the-money forward rate), and a short call on S(t, x) (or a “caplet”
with a strike price that is higher than the at-the-money forward rate). The bond as a whole, therefore,
is a combination of forwards, ﬂoorlets and caplets. Continuing with the option terminology, we can
also observe that the payoff to investor A is often referred to as a long “bull call spread,” and for this
reason we refer to the payoff in the current context as a long “longevity bull call spread.”
5.5.16. Let us suppose that, for each t, Sl(t) and Su(t) have been chosen so that the value of the ﬂoorlet
and the caplet are equal. In this case, the price payable at time 0 by investor A is equal to the sum of
the prices of the T forward contracts paying S(t, x) − Sl(t) at times t=1,…,T. This is equal to (i) the
price for the longevity bond paying S(t, x) at times t= 1,…,T, minus (ii) the price for the ﬁxed-interest
bond paying Sl(t) at times t= 1,…,T. This structure therefore gives investors a similar exposure to the
risks in S(t, x) for a lower initial price. For this reason, we describe the collection of longevity bull
spreads as a geared longevity bond.
5.5.17. As an alternative, Su(t) might be set to 1, meaning that the caplet has zero value (S(t, x)
cannot be bigger than 1). With this structure, investor A has full protection against unanticipated
improvements in longevity, but gives away any beneﬁts from poorer longevity than anticipated.
5.5.18. It is important to note in the above construction that there is a smooth progression in the
division of the coupon payments between the counterparties over the range of S(t, x). This is pre-
ferable to a contract that has a jump in the amount of the payment as S(t, x) crosses some threshold:
as often happens with such contracts as barrier options, arguments can often arise as to whether the
particular threshold was crossed or not. Such difﬁculties are avoided with the smooth progression.
5.5.19. The bond described here is a variation on the Société Générale structure where the payoff at
T depends only on the single survivor index S(T, x). In the more general case, the payoff depends on
the values of S(1, x),…,S(T, x) and the forecast values at T of S(T + 1, x),S(T + 2, x),….
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6. Index Versus Customised Hedges, and Basis Risk
6.1. Overview
Lucida and Canada Life implemented two very different kinds of capital markets longevity hedges in
2008. Lucida executed a standardised hedge linked to a population mortality index, whereas Canada
Life executed a customised hedge linked to the actual mortality experience of a population of annui-
tants. Aegon’s hedges with Deutsche Bank in 2012 and with Société Générale in 2013 were also index
hedges, but they were designed to minimise the basis risk involved.46 It is important to understand the
differences between index and customised hedges. It is also important to understand, measure and
manage the basis risk in index hedges. This, in turn, will have implications for regulatory capital relief.
6.2. Index Versus Customised Hedges
6.2.1. Standardised index-based longevity hedges have some advantages over the customised hedges
that are currently more familiar to pension funds and annuity providers. In particular, they have the
advantages of simplicity, cost and greater potential for liquidity. But they also have obvious dis-
advantages, principally the fact that they are not perfect hedges and leave a residual basis risk (see
Table 6) that requires the index hedge to be carefully calibrated.
6.2.2. Coughlan et al. (2007b) show that a liquid, hedge-effective market could be built around just
eight standardised q-forward contracts with:
∙ a speciﬁc maturity (e.g. 10 years);
∙ two genders (male, female);
∙ four age buckets (50–59, 60–69, 70–79, 80–89).
6.2.3. Figure 7 presents the mortality improvement correlations within the male 70–79 age bucket
which is centred on age 75 (Coughlan et al., 2007c). These ﬁgures show that the correlations (based
on graduated mortality rates) are very high. Consequently, a tailored hedge using, say, 10 q-forwards
Table 6. Standardised Index Hedges Versus Customised Hedges
Advantages Disadvantages
Standardised
index hedge
∙ Cheaper than customised hedges
∙ Lower set-up/operational costs
∙ Shorter maturity, so lower counterparty
credit exposure
∙ Not a perfect hedge:
° Basis risk
° Roll risk
° Base table estimation risk
Customised hedge ∙ Exact hedge, so no residual basis risk
∙ Set-and-forget hedge, requires minimal
monitoring
∙ More expensive than standardised hedge
∙ High set-up and operational costs
∙ Poor liquidity
∙ Credit risk: Longer maturity, so larger
counterparty credit exposure
∙ Less attractive to investors
Source: Coughlan (2007a).
46 Aegon had a history of buying up smaller insurance companies all over Holland, so had a well-diversiﬁed
mortality base that was similar to that of (and therefore highly correlated with) the national population, so the
population basis risk in the hedge was minimal.
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on ages 70–79 will be only marginally more effective than a single q-forward using a standard 70–79
age bucket. Coughlan (2007a) estimates that the hedge effectiveness (of a value hedge) is around
86% (i.e. the standard deviation of the liabilities is reduced by 86%, leaving a residual risk of 14%)
for a large and well-diversiﬁed pension plan or annuity portfolio: see Figure 8.47
6.2.4. In order to keep the number of contracts to a manageable level, individual contracts use the
average (or “bucketed”) mortality across 10 ages rather than single ages. This averaging has positive
and negative effects. On the one hand, the averaging reduces the basis risk that arises from the non-
systematic mortality risk that is present in crude mortality rates, even at the population level.48 On
the other hand, it introduces some basis risk depending on the speciﬁc age-structure of the popu-
lation being hedged. This we now discuss in more detail.
6.3. Basis Risk
6.3.1. Basis risk is the residual risk associated with imperfect hedging where the movements in the
underlying exposure are not perfectly correlated with movements in the hedging instrument. Basis
risk and its quantiﬁcation have recently attracted the attention of both academics and practitioners
(e.g. Li & Hardy, 2011; Cairns et al., 2014; Longevity Basis Risk Working Group, 2014; Villegas
et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; Cairns & El Boukfaoui, 2018).
6.3.2. Within the context of longevity risk hedging, a number of sources of basis risk arise: popu-
lation basis risk; base-table risk; structural risk; restatement risk; and idiosyncratic risk.
6.3.3. Population basis risk is, perhaps, the form of basis risk that most readily comes to mind when
considering an index based longevity hedge. Speciﬁcally, a hedger might choose to use a hedging
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Figure 7. Five-year mortality improvement correlations with England & Wales males aged 75
Source: Coughlan et al. (2007c, Figure 9.6).
47 A subsequent study by Coughlan et al. (2011) reconﬁrmed the high degree of effectiveness available with
longevity hedges based on national population indices for large pension plans. This study considered a pension
fund with a membership whose mortality experience was the same as the UK CMI (Continuous Mortality
Investigation) assured lives population; with a hedge based on the England & Wales LifeMetrics Index, hedge
effectiveness of 82.4% could be achieved. The same study also considered a pension fund with a membership
whose mortality experience was the same at the population of California. With a hedge based on the US
LifeMetrics Index, hedge effectiveness of 86.5% could be achieved.
48 For example, for England & Wales males, variation in the bucketed q-forward payoff that is solely due to
non-systematic mortality risk (i.e. sampling variation in the death counts) will have a standard deviation of
around 0.3% of the value of the q-forward ﬁxed leg. Relative to the uncertainty in the true mortality rate
underpinning the q-forward payoff with a 10-year horizon, this sampling variation is negligible.
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instrument that is linked to a different population from its own population that it wishes to hedge.
This is most common where the hedging instrument is linked to an index based on national mortality
rates, while the hedger’s own population is a distinctive sub-population with different characteristics
from the national average. As a consequence, underlying mortality rates might not just be at a
different level from that of the national population, but rates of improvement in both the short and
long term might not be perfectly correlated. Modelling and understanding the differences between
two populations is an active and rapidly developing subject of research.49
6.3.4. Base-table risk concerns how accurately hedgers and also receivers of longevity risk are able to
assess the mortality base table for both the hedger’s own population and the national population.
Whether or not base-table risk contributes to residual risk for the hedger then depends on the nature
of the longevity hedge. At one end of the spectrum, from the perspective of the hedger, a customised
longevity swap leaves the hedger with no base-table risk, while the receiver is exposed and should
charge a higher price to reﬂect this extra risk. In contrast, for an index-based hedge, base-table risk
will be relevant. Base-table risk will then make a more signiﬁcant contribution to total basis risk if
the hedger’s own population is small or the time horizon of the hedge is short.
6.3.5. Structural risk relates to the design of the hedging instrument, and it can arise even if there is
no population basis risk or base-table risk:
∙ The hedging instrument might have a non-linear payoff as a function of the underlying risk.
This includes contracts with an option-type payoff structure such as the bull call spread in
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Figure 8. The hedge effectiveness of q-forwards
Source: Coughlan (2007a).
49 Modelling population basis risk is also a key ongoing element of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’
ARC research programme on ‘Modelling Measurement and Management of Longevity and Morbidity Risk’
(www.actuaries.org.uk/arc).
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Michaelson & Mulholland (2014) and Cairns & El Boukfaoui (2018), leaving residual risk both
below and above the attachment and exhaustion points. It also includes q-forwards: these do not
include any optionality, but liability cashﬂows are typically non-linear combinations of the
underlying mortality rates.
∙ The hedging instrument might have a ﬁnite maturity, meaning that the longevity risk that emerges
after the maturity date is a residual risk that cannot be hedged.
∙ The reference ages embedded in the hedging instruments might not allow exact matching of the
ages in the hedger’s population.
∙ The number of units of the hedging instrument (i.e. the hedge ratio) might not be optimal (i.e.
might not minimise residual risk). This might be either unavoidable or unintentional (e.g. through
the use of a poorly calibrated model).
∙ Hedging instruments might not incorporate an inﬂation linkage and so might not match well with
realised pension plan or annuity beneﬁt increases.
In general, structural risk can be adjusted, for example, through the choice of: attachment and
exhaustion points; the maturity date; the reference ages; the number of q- or S-forwards; and careful
calibration and optimisation using the chosen stochastic mortality model.
6.3.6. Restatement risk concerns the possibility that ofﬁcial estimates of the national population or
death counts might be revised up or down, with potential impacts on index-based hedge payoffs
(Cairns et al., 2016). Restatements will often impact on previously stated mortality rates (especially
following a decennial census). Index-based longevity hedges will probably link contractually to the
ﬁrst announcement of a mortality rate, meaning that the restatement of past mortality rates will not
alter past payments and hence introduce an additional risk. However, restatements will also have an
impact on future estimated population numbers and consequent mortality rates. The future risks and
impacts of such restatements can be assessed through use of the same methodology for identifying
phantoms proposed in Cairns et al. (2016).
6.3.7. Idiosyncratic risk50 is primarily linked to sampling variation and its ﬁnancial impact within the
hedger’s population. As with some other examples of basis risk, the impact of idiosyncratic risk will
depend on the nature of the hedge (indemnity versus other forms). Given the evolution of the
systematic risk in the underlying mortality rates, individuals will either die or survive independently
of each other. Proportionately, this risk is larger for smaller pension funds. The level of idiosyncratic
risk is also dependent on the heterogeneity in pension amounts (leading to concentration risk): for
example, a 1,000-member pension plan in which 10% of the members are directors (or “big
cheeses”) who generate 90% of the liabilities will be more risky than a 1,000-member plan with
equal pensions.
6.3.8. Finally, as remarked in Cairns (2014), accurate assessment of basis risk is one part of the
process of choosing the best hedge. First, one needs to identify the different options for hedging.51
Second, the risk appetite of the hedger needs to be properly assessed. Third, there needs to be an
accurate assessment of the basis risk under each hedge. Fourth, prices need to be established for each
50 That is, randomness in individual lifetimes and ﬁnancial concentrations associated with a small group of
individuals.
51 Good enterprise risk management means consideration of all of the available options. Although challen-
ging, the administrative costs of carrying out such an exercise is small compared to the potential economic impact
of making the right or wrong choice.
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hedge. Fifth, the combination of price, basis risk and risk appetite then point to a best choice out of
all of the options available to the hedger.52 Cairns (2014) also highlights that no single hedging
option is best for all pension plans. Everything else being equal, customised hedges are more likely to
be preferred to index hedges by: smaller pension plans rather than larger (due to the greater idio-
syncratic risk); and pension plan sponsors that are more risk averse. Also, certain hedging options
(e.g. longevity swaps) are currently only available to pension plans with sufﬁciently large liabilities.
6.4. Other Types of Basis Risk
Other forms of basis risk might arise if a pension plan seeks to hedge the longevity risk associated
with a group of active or deferred members, rather than retired members. These groups bring
additional risks, including member options (such as lump sum commutation, trivial commutation,
early/late retirement, increasing a partner’s beneﬁts at the expense of the member’s beneﬁts, and
pension increase exchanges), partner status at retirement or member death and salary risk. The
plan’s quantum of exposure to longevity risk depends on how these risks turn out, a risk that itself
is not hedgeable.
7. Credit Risk, Regulatory Capital and Collateral
7.1. Overview
Another risk in Table 6 is counterparty credit risk. This is the risk that one of the counterparties to,
say, a longevity swap contract defaults owing money to the other counterparty. When a swap is ﬁrst
initiated, both counterparties might expect a zero excess proﬁt or loss.53 But over time, as a result of
realised mortality rates deviating from the rates that were forecast at the time the swap started, one
counterparty’s position will be showing a proﬁt and the other will be showing an equivalent loss. The
insurance industry addresses this issue via regulatory capital and the capital markets deal with it via
collateral.
7.2. Regulatory Capital
7.2.1. The regulatory regime covering insurance companies domiciled in the UK is governed by the
Solvency II Directive which came into effect in January 2016 and is used to set regulatory capital
requirements.
7.2.2. Regulatory capital is the level of capital or Own Funds required by an insurer’s regulatory
authority, the PRA in the UK. Solvency II begins with a calculation of the insurer’s liabilities, known
as technical provisions, which comprises a “best estimate” of the liabilities plus a risk margin – in the
case where the liability cannot be reliably measured and/or suitably hedged. The sum of the best
52 Conversely, a hedger’s advisers should not let concerns about their own reputational risk inﬂuence
recommendations: arguably, reputational risk is smaller for indemnity based hedges, and larger for index-based
hedges which require higher levels of skill in modelling mortality.
53 This is the case for a transaction involving a pension plan and an insurer, where allowance is made for the
insurer’s cost of capital and normal proﬁt etc. In a transaction involving an insurer and a reinsurer, it is typical for
fees to be added to the ‘ﬁxed leg’, so commercially there will be a loss to the cedant on day 1.
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estimate and risk margin can be thought of as the market consistent value or fair value. On top of
this, insurers must issue additional risk-based capital to meet ﬁrst the Minimum Capital Requirement
(MCR) and then the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR).
7.2.3. A major objective of Solvency II is to value all assets and liabilities on a market-consistent
basis and to ensure that the regulatory capital that insurance companies issue reﬂects all the
unhedged risks on their balance sheets. The capital should be sufﬁcient to ensure that an insurance
company can either (i) survive the next 12 months with a 99.5% probability or (ii) survive a set of
prescribed stress tests. The amount required can be determined using either a stochastic internal
model or through the use of the standard stress test, which in the case of longevity risk is a sudden
20% reduction in mortality rates across all ages. For a 65-year old UK male, this corresponds
approximately to a 1.5-year increase in life expectancy or a 7% increase in pension liabilities.
7.2.4. A consequence of any market-consistent approach is that both assets and liabilities are prone to
market volatility. Insurance companies invest in long-term illiquid assets, like infrastructure, real estate
and equity release mortgages, to reduce asset price volatility, and in corporate bonds to beneﬁt from
the credit and illiquidity premia embodied in their higher returns compared with government bonds.
7.2.5. In the case of long-term liabilities, such as annuities and buy-outs, short-term asset price
volatility can be partially offset by “matching adjustments” (MAs). MAs are part of Solvency II
regulations that depart from a market-consistent approach, by allowing insurers54 to estimate the
illiquidity premium – inherent in the asset portfolio if it contains such illiquid assets – to be added to
the risk-free rate for the purposes of discounting liabilities. To do this, the insurer needs to allocate a
speciﬁc pool of assets to the liability, where the assets are selected to match the cash-ﬂow char-
acteristics of the liability. The assets need to be matched for the entire term of the liability, in which
case the liability can be valued using the higher but less volatile MA-adjusted discount rate. Because
both the level and volatility of the liability calculated using this approach are now lower, lower levels
of Own Funds and hence SCR are needed. However, because of longevity risk and the dearth of
long-maturity longevity-linked assets available to hold in the portfolio, the asset match can never be
perfect. The higher MA-adjusted discount rate is reduced somewhat to allow for this and the level of
Own Funds correspondingly raised. A particular example is non-pensioner members of pension
plans who have both greater longevity risk and more optionality than pensioner members. Both these
factors lower the MA-adjusted discount rate and, by raising the level of Own Funds, increase the cost
of providing deferred annuities to the pension plan or buying out this segment of the pension plan.
Insurers also make use of reinsurance to reduce the volatility of liabilities and this will again have an
effect on Own Funds.
7.2.6. One possible implication of Solvency II is that insurers might migrate away from the current
cash-ﬂow hedging paradigm towards the value-hedging paradigm. Speciﬁcally, insurers might aim to
hedge their liability in one year’s time as a way to reduce their SCR under Solvency II. This requires
comparison of liability and hedge instrument values one year ahead.
7.2.7. Despite Solvency II, some pension plans considering de-risking remain concerned about the
ﬁnancial strength of some insurers, which is why consultants, such as Barnett Waddingham, have
launched an insurer ﬁnancial strength review service, providing information on an insurer’s struc-
ture, solvency position, credit rating and key risks in their business model.
54 And reinsurers.
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7.2.8. Regulatory capital deals principally with the credit risk of the insurer.55 Conversely, the
insurer faces credit risk from the pension plan in the case of, say, a longevity swap, and collateral
would need to be posted to deal with this.
7.3. Collateral
7.3.1. The role of collateral is to reduce if not entirely eliminate counterparty credit risk in both
capital market transactions and insurance contracts.
7.3.2. Collateral in the form of high-quality securities needs to be posted by the loss-making
counterparty to cover such losses. However, the collateral needs to be funded and the funding costs
will depend on the level of interest rates. Further, the quality of the collateral and the conditions
under which a counterparty can substitute one form of collateral for another need to be agreed. This
is done in the credit support annex (CSA) to the ISDA56 Master Agreement that establishes the swap.
The CSA also speciﬁes how different types of collateral will be priced.
7.3.3. All these factors are important for determining the value of the swap at different stages in its life.
Bifﬁs et al. (2016) use a theoretical model to show that the overall cost of collateralisation in mortality or
longevity swaps is similar to or lower than those found in the interest-rate swaps market on account of
the diversifying effects of interest rate and longevity risks –which are to a ﬁrst order uncorrelated risks. In
practice, agreeing the value of the collateral involves an iterative process. Valuing the ﬁxed leg is generally
straightforward, but there can be differences of opinion in valuing the ﬂoating leg. It is typical in
reinsurance contract negotiations for both sides to recommend a basis. If the difference is too far apart,
both sides agree to bring in either one or two external experts. If only one is used, both sides are bound
by their assessment. If two are used and they are close, both sides agree to split the difference: if they are
still too far apart, both sides will allow the experts to appoint an agreed third expert.
8. Liquidity
8.1. Liquidity is another important issue raised in Table 6. The key problem with customised
solutions for some participants57 is that they are not liquid and cannot easily be reversed. By
contrast, liquidity is a key advantage of deep and well-developed capital market solutions.
8.2. To ensure long-term viability, it is critical that a traded capital market instrument meets the
needs of both hedgers and speculators (or traders). The former require hedge effectiveness, while the
latter supply liquidity. However, liquidity requires standardised contracts. The fewer the number of
standardised contracts traded, the greater the potential liquidity in each contract, but the lower the
potential hedge effectiveness. There is therefore an important tradeoff to be made, such that the
number of standardised contracts traded provides both adequate hedge effectiveness and adequate
liquidity.
55 It also covers the insurer’s underwriting, market and operational risks.
56 International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
57 It is not an issue for a pension plan if it is doing a longevity swap as a step to buy-out.
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8.3. If they are ever to achieve adequate liquidity, it is likely that capital-markets-based solutions will
have to adopt mortality indices based on the national population as the primary means of trans-
ferring longevity risk or sub-population indices that are transparent, trustworthy, reliable and
durable. However, potential hedgers, such as life assurers and pension funds, face a longevity risk
exposure that is speciﬁc to their own policyholders and plan members: for example, it might be
concentrated in speciﬁc socio-economic groups or in speciﬁc individuals such as the sponsoring
company’s directors. Hedging using population mortality indices means that life assurers and pen-
sion funds will face basis risk if their longevity exposure differs from that of the national population.
Herein lies the tension between index-based hedges and customised hedges of longevity risk, and, in
turn, the unavoidable trade-off between basis risk and liquidity.
8.4. The involvement of the capital markets would help to reduce the cost of managing longevity risk.
This is because it should lead to an increase in capacity, together with greater pricing transparency (as a
result of the activities of arbitrageurs58) and greater liquidity (as a result of the activities of speculators).
These conditions should attract the interest of ILS investors, hedge funds, private equity investors,
sovereign wealth funds, endowments, family ofﬁces and other investors seeking asset classes that have
low correlation with existing ﬁnancial assets. Longevity-linked assets naturally ﬁt this bill.
8.5. Currently, there is still insufﬁcient interest from these classes of investor. However, Figure 1
shows how the market might eventually come into balance, with increasing numbers of potential
sellers of longevity risk protection attracted by a suitable risk premium to enter the market to meet
the huge demands of potential buyers.
9. Mortality Models
9.1. Overview
It is clear from the solutions we have described above that mortality models play a critical role in
their design and pricing (see, e.g. Figures 3 and 6). There are three classes of stochastic mortality
model in use (with some models straddling more than one class):
∙ extrapolative or time series models;
∙ process-based models – which examine the biomedical processes that lead to death;
∙ explanatory or causal models – which use information on factors which are believed to inﬂuence
mortality rates such as cohort (i.e. year of birth), socio-economic status, lifestyle, geographical
location, housing, education, medical advances and infectious diseases.
Most of the models currently in use are in the ﬁrst of these classes and we will concentrate on these in
this section.
9.2. Extrapolative or Time Series Models – Single Population Variants
9.2.1. There are four classes of time-series-based mortality model in use. First is the Lee-Carter class
of models (Lee & Carter, 1992), which makes no assumption about the degree of smoothness in
58 However, to be effective, arbitrageurs need well-deﬁned pricing relationships between related securities and
we are still at the very early days in the development of this market.
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mortality rates across adjacent ages or years. Second is the Cairns–Blake–Dowd (CBD) class of
models (Cairns, Blake & Dowd, 2006), which builds in an assumption of smoothness in mortality
rates across adjacent ages in the same year (but not between years).59 Third is the P-splines model
(Currie et al., 2004) which assumes smoothness across both years and ages.60 Finally, there is the
Age-Period-Cohort (APC) model which has its origins in medical statistics (Osmond, 1985; Jacobsen
et al., 2002), and was ﬁrst introduced in an actuarial context by Renshaw & Haberman (2006).
Other features have also jumped from one class to another with the resulting genealogy mapped out
in Figure 9. The ﬁrst two classes of models have also been extended to allow for a cohort effect.61 All
these models were subjected to a rigorous analysis in Cairns et al. (2009, 2011a) and Dowd et al.
(2010b, 2010c). The models were assessed for their goodness of ﬁt to historical data and for both
their ex-ante and ex-post forecasting properties.
9.2.2. Cairns et al. (2009) used a set of quantitative and qualitative criteria to assess each model’s
ability to explain historical patterns of mortality: quality of ﬁt, as measured by the Bayes Information
Criterion (BIC); ease of implementation; parsimony; transparency; incorporation of cohort effects;
ability to produce a non-trivial correlation structure between ages; and robustness of parameter
estimates relative to the period of data employed. The study concluded that a version of the CBD
Figure 9. A genealogy of stochastic mortality models
Source: Adapted from Cairns (2014)
59 The CBD model was speciﬁcally designed for modelling higher age (55 + ) mortality rates. It has recently
been generalised to account for the different structure of mortality rates at lower ages by, e.g. Plat (2009) and
Hunt & Blake (2014).
60 Other academic studies of mortality models include Hobcraft et al. (1982), Booth et al. (2002a, 2002b),
Brouhns et al. (2002a, 2001b, 2005), Renshaw and Haberman (2003a, 2003b, 2006, 2008), Darkiewicz &
Hoedemakers (2004), Bifﬁs (2005), Czado et al. (2005), Delwarde et al. (2007), Koissi et al. (2006), Pedroza
(2006), Bauer et al. (2008, 2010), Gourieroux and Monfort (2008), Hari et al. (2008), Kuang et al. (2008),
Haberman & Renshaw (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013), Hatzopoulos and Haberman (2009, 2011), Li et al. (2009,
2015a), Wang and Preston (2009), Bifﬁs et al. (2010), Debonneuil (2010), Lin and Tzeng (2010), Murphy (2010),
Yang et al. (2010), Coelho and Nunes (2011), D’Amato et al. (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), Gaille and Sherris
(2011), Li and Chan (2011), Milidonis et al. (2011), Russo et al. (2011), Russolillo et al. (2011), Sweeting (2011),
Wang et al. (2011), Alai & Sherris (2014b), Aleksic and Börger (2012), Hainaut (2012), Hyndman et al. (2013),
Mitchell et al. (2013), Nielsen and Nielsen (2014), Mayhew and Smith (2014), Danesi et al. (2015), O’Hare and
Li (2015), Berkum et al. (2016), Currie (2016) and Richards et al. (2017).
61 See, e.g. Cairns et al. (2009).
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model allowing for a cohort effect was found to have the most robust and stable parameter estimates
over time using mortality data from both England &Wales and the US. This model (usually referred
to as “M7”) is now the keystone of one of the two approaches recommended by the Life and
Longevity Markets Association (LLMA)62 (Longevity Basis Risk Working Group, 2014, Villegas
et al., 2017, and Li et al., 2017).
9.2.3. Cairns et al. (2011a) focused on the qualitative forecasting properties of the models63 by
evaluating the ex-ante plausibility of their probability density forecasts in terms of the following
qualitative criteria: biological reasonableness;64 the plausibility of predicted levels of uncertainty in
forecasts at different ages; and the robustness of the forecasts relative to the sample period used to ﬁt
the models. The study found that while a good ﬁt to historical data, as measured by the BIC, is a
promising starting point, it does not guarantee sensible forecasts. For example, one version of the
CBD model allowing for a cohort effect produced such implausible forecasts of US male mortality
rates that it could be dismissed as a suitable forecasting model. This study also found that the Lee-
Carter model produced forecasts at higher ages that were “too precise,” in the sense of having too
little uncertainty relative to historical volatility. The problems with these particular models were not
evident from simply estimating their parameters: they only became apparent when the models were
used for forecasting. The other models (including the APC model) performed well, producing robust
and biologically plausible forecasts.
9.2.4. It is also important to examine the ex post forecasting performance of the models. This
involves conducting both backtesting and goodness-of-ﬁt analyses. Dowd et al. (2010b), undertook
the ﬁrst of these analyses. Backtesting is based on the idea that forecast distributions should be
compared against subsequently realised mortality outcomes and if the realised outcomes are com-
patible with their forecasted distributions, then this would suggest that the models that generated
them are good ones, and vice versa. The study examined four different classes of backtest: those
based on the convergence of forecasts through time towards the mortality rate(s) in a given year;
those based on the accuracy of forecasts over multiple horizons; those based on the accuracy of
forecasts over rolling ﬁxed-length horizons; and those based on formal hypothesis tests that involve
comparisons of realised outcomes against forecasts of the relevant densities over speciﬁed horizons.
The study found that the Lee-Carter model, the APC model and the CBD model (both with and
without a cohort effect) performed well most of the time and there was relatively little to choose
between them. However, another version of the Lee-Carter model allowing for a cohort effect
repeatedly showed evidence of instability.65
9.2.5. Dowd et al. (2010c) set out a framework for evaluating the goodness of ﬁt of stochastic
mortality models and applied it to the same models considered by Dowd et al. (2010b). The
methodology used exploited the structure of each model to obtain various residual series that are
predicted to be independently and identically distributed (iid) standard normal under the null
hypothesis of model adequacy. Goodness of ﬁt can then be assessed using conventional tests of the
62 www.llma.org
63 The P-splines model was excluded from the analysis because of its inability to produce fully stochastic
projections of future mortality rates.
64 A method of reasoning used to establish a causal association (or relationship) between two factors that is
consistent with existing medical knowledge.
65 See Renshaw & Haberman (2006). This was later explained in terms of a missing identiﬁcation condition
in the model (Hunt & Villegas, 2015).
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predictions of iid standard normality. For the data set considered (English & Welsh male mortality
data over ages 64–89 and years 1961–2007), there are some notable differences amongst the various
models, but none of the models performed well in all tests and no model clearly dominates the others.
In particular, all the models failed to capture long-term changes in the trend in mortality rates.
Further development work on these models is therefore needed. It might be the case that there is no
single best model and that some models work well in some countries, while others work well in other
countries.
9.2.6. The CBD model appears to work well in England &Wales for higher ages, and Figures 10–12
present three applications of the model using ONS data for England & Wales.
9.2.7. The ﬁrst (Figure 10) is a longevity fan chart (Dowd et al, 2010a), which shows the increasing
funnel of uncertainty concerning future life expectancies out to 2052 of 65-year-old males from
England & Wales.66 By 2047, life expectancy from age 65 is centred around 23 years, shown by the
dark central band: an increase of 4 years on the expectation for the year 2017. The different bands
within the fan correspond to 5% bands of probability with the lower and upper boundaries at the
5% and 95% quantiles. Adding these together, the whole fan chart shows the 90% conﬁdence
interval for the forecast range of outcomes. We can be 90% conﬁdent that by 2047, the life
expectancy of a 65-year-old English & Welsh male will lie between 21.3 and 24.3. This represents a
huge range of uncertainty. Since every additional year of life expectancy at age 65 adds around
4–5%67 to the present value of pension liabilities, the cost of providing pensions in 2060 could be
7–8% higher than the best estimate for 2047 made in 2017.
9.2.8. The second is a survivor fan chart (Blake et al., 2008), which shows the 90% conﬁdence
interval for the survival rates of English & Welsh males who reached 65 at the end of 2016.
Figure 11 shows that there is relatively little survivorship risk before age 75: a fairly reliable estimate
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Figure 10. Longevity fan chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh males
Source: Own calculations.
66 Note projections run from 2017 based on a variant of the CBD model estimated using data for ages 50–89
and years 1977–2016.
67 See paragraph 2.2.
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is that 20% of this group will have died by age 75.68 The uncertainty increases rapidly after 75 and
reaches a maximum just after age 90, when anywhere between 27% and 38% of the original cohort
will still be alive. We then have the long “tail” where the remainder of this cohort dies out some time
between 2042 and 2062.
9.2.9. The third is a mortality fan chart which shows the 90% conﬁdence interval for 65-year old
English & Welsh males who reached 65 at the end of 2016. Figure 12 shows that there is an
increasingly low probability of surviving year to year at very high ages, even with predicted mortality
improvements.
9.2.10. By building off a good mortality forecasting model estimated using data from an objective,
transparent and relevant set of mortality indices, fan charts provide a very useful tool for both
quantifying and visually understanding longevity, survivor and mortality risks.
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Figure 11. Cohort survivor fan chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh males
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 12. Cohort mortality fan chart for 65-year-old English & Welsh males
Source: Own calculations.
68 This is one of the reasons why the EIB/BNP Paribas bond discussed in paragraph 1.1.1 was considered
expensive: the ﬁrst 10 years of cash ﬂows are, in present value terms, the most costly cash ﬂows of a bond, and, in
the case of the EIB bond, incorporate a longevity hedge that is not really needed.
Still living with mortality
35
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321718000314
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 25 Feb 2019 at 20:02:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
9.2.11. One key problem that extrapolative models have is their difﬁculty in differentiating between
a genuine change in the trend of mortality rates and a temporary blip in mortality rates until some
time after the change has occurred. In 2016, the UK Ofﬁce for National Statistics reported that
longevity improvements rates at very high ages have slowed down since 2011; but it is not yet clear
whether this is a genuine change in the long-term trend, a short-term austerity-driven adjustment, or
just the result of a purely random deviation from the previous trend.69 Nevertheless, it prompted a
debate in the UK in 2016 about the reliability of life expectancy projections. Mortality improvements
in UK males averaged 0.6% p.a. over the preceding four years, compared with 3.2% p.a. in the
decade before and 1.5–2% between 1995 and 2000.70 In response to a possible trend change, the UK
Continuous Mortality Investigation (CMI) has lowered its estimate of both male and female life
expectancy at age 65 over 4 consecutive years, as Table 7 shows.
9.2.12. In October 2016, Tim Gordon, head of longevity at Aon Hewitt, said: “This is the most
extreme reversal in mortality improvement trends seen in the past 40 years. What was initially
assumed by many actuaries to be a blip is increasingly looking more like an earlier-than-expected
fall-off in mortality improvements. The industry is currently trying to digest all the implications of
this emerging information and – inevitably – it is taking time to feed through into insurance and
reinsurance pricing.” Others say that this could just be “noise.” Matt Wilmington, director of
pension risk transfer at Legal & General (L&G), points out that: “Two years doesn’t make a trend –
it’s very volatile from year to year. If we had another ﬁve years where we saw far fewer deaths than
expected, then we might start to see fairly signiﬁcant changes, but where we are now, there’s not
enough to persuade us – or many of the pension plans we work with – that there’s a vast reversal in
trend in terms of life expectancy just yet.” Despite this, Aon Hewitt said that there was sufﬁcient
dislocation in the pricing of longevity swaps that pension plans should consider delaying transactions
until the market corrects. By the middle of 2017, Aon Hewitt reported that the longevity market was
back in sync.71 However, Tim Gordon also warned against attempts to time the market: “Timing the
longevity market in the same way you would time an equity market is extremely difﬁcult, and plans
could be in danger of missing opportunities now if they did that.” The difference in mortality
improvement rates before and after 2011 is equivalent to a difference in liabilities of 1% or 4 months
Table 7. UK Life Expectancy at Age 65
Version of the CMI Model Male (years) Female(years)
CMI_2013 22.8 25.1
CMI_2014 22.8 24.9
CMI_2015 22.5 24.6
CMI_2016 22.2 24.1
Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation.
69 Anthony Hilton (2016) Life line, Pensions World, May. See also www.bbc.com/news/health-4060825
70 Own calculations: ages 60–89 covering the periods 2001–2011 (3.2% p.a. improvements) and 2011–2015
(0.6%). Females 2.6% falling to 0.2%.
71 All quotes taken from Jenna Gadhavi (2017) Does the bell toll for longevity swaps?, Engaged Investor, 13
January; http://aon.mediaroom.com/news-releases?item=137499; and http://aon.mediaroom.com/news-releases?
item=137590
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of pension payments for every retiree: UK pension liabilities would be £25bn lower if the future
mortality improvement rate were 1% rather than 3%.72
9.2.13. Consultant Barnett Waddingham has put forward the suggestion that higher health and
social care spending between 2000 and 2010 (which grew at an average annual real rate of 4%) may
have caused a blip in longevity estimates by accelerating improvements. Since 2009, health spending
has grown at just 1% per annum in real terms, social care spending has fallen in real terms, and there
have been lower mortality improvements – although this correlation does not imply causation.73
9.3. Extrapolative or Time Series Models – Multi-Population Variants
9.3.1. There are a number of reasons why it might be appropriate or desirable to model two or more
populations simultaneously. First, a pension plan might often be relatively small in relation to the
national population; it might have a relatively short run of data (e.g. relatively limited coverage of
ages, or only a few calendar years of observations) or simply have a lot of sampling variation. In
contrast, many national populations have a much longer run of data. By modelling the two popu-
lations in tandem and exploiting the correlations between the two, it might be possible to achieve
better quality forecasts for the pension plan. Second, the use of multiple population mortality models
enables more accurate modelling of the relationships between two or more groups that are directly of
interest (e.g. males and females; assured lives and annuitants in a life insurer’s book of business; life
insurance portfolios in different countries, etc.). This will lead to better consistency in forecasts as
well as, for example, an assessment of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts of having less-than-perfectly cor-
related groups of lives. Third, multi-population modelling is essential for any institution seeking to
hedge its exposure to longevity risk using index-based hedging instruments: the model is required to
assess the level of basis risk in the transaction.
9.3.2. The development of multi-population mortality models has lagged single population model-
ling quite considerably partly due to a lack of good quality sub-population datasets (the CMI assured
lives dataset being a notable exception). The Human Mortality Database (HMD) has data for many
countries and offers a useful starting point, but sub-population data present particular challenges
that are often not present in international data (e.g. shorter runs of data, smaller population sizes,
etc.). In the demography literature, Li and Lee (2005) laid out some key foundations: in particular,
the principle of coherence. The ratio of mortality rates in two populations can and will vary over
time. However, the principle of coherence requires that this ratio should not diverge over time
towards zero or inﬁnity.74 In the actuarial literature, key early contributions have been made by
Cairns et al. (2011b), Dowd et al. (2011), Li and Hardy (2011) and Börger et al. (2013).75 More
recently, Villegas et al. (2017) carried out an extensive review of both existing and potential new
72 Professional Pensions, 26 January 2017.
73 Professional Pensions, 29 March 2017. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies: “But looking at all
Department of Health spending rather than the NHS only, after adjusting for the ageing of the population, per-
capita real spending will be lower in 2019–20 than in 2009–10. An additional £1.3 billion of Department of
Health spending would be required in 2019–20 just to maintain 2009–10 levels” (Luchinskaya et al., 2017).
74 As an example, the principle of coherence means that male mortality rates should (mostly) remain a bit
higher than female mortality in the long run, and not cross over with certainty as can happen if single population
models are ﬁtted to each group independently.
75 See also Jarner and Kryger (2011), Njenga and Sherris (2011), Börger and Ruß (2012), Zhou et al. (2014),
Chen et al. (2015), Kleinow (2015), Li et al. (2015b) and Enchev et al. (2017).
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multi-population models. Despite the general popularity of the Li & Lee (2005) model, their model
has been found to be quite unsuitable for some actuarial applications by both Villegas et al. (2017)
and Enchev et al. (2017). Speciﬁcally, applications that require a stochastic assessment of longevity
risk (e.g. measurement of basis risk or diversiﬁcation beneﬁts) require models that have a plausible
correlation term structure: the Li and Lee model fails on this criterion.76
9.3.3. To satisfy the principle of coherence, Cairns et al. (2011b) make use of a mean-reverting
stochastic spread that allows for different trends in mortality improvement rates in the short-run, but
parallel improvements in the long run. This study uses a Bayesian framework that allows the
estimation of the unobservable state variables that determine mortality and of the parameters of the
stochastic processes that drive those state variables to be combined into a single step. The key
beneﬁts of this include a dampening of the impact of Poisson variation in death counts,77 full
allowance for parameter uncertainty, and the ﬂexibility to deal with missing data.
9.3.4. Dowd et al. (2011) employ a “gravity” model to achieve coherence using an iterative esti-
mation procedure.78 The larger population is modelled independently (similar to the approach
recommended by Villegas et al., 2017), but the smaller population is modelled in terms of spreads (or
deviations) relative to the evolution of the larger population. To satisfy the principle of coherence,
the spreads in the period and cohort effects between the larger and smaller populations depend on
gravity or spread reversion parameters for the two effects. The larger the two gravity parameters, the
more strongly the smaller population’s mortality rates move in line with those of the larger popu-
lation in the long run.
9.3.5. In their comprehensive comparison of two-population models, Villegas et al. (2017) ﬁnd that
two models satisfy best their criteria for a good two-population model: the common age effect model
(Kleinow, 2015) with a cohort effect added; and a variant of the CBD family labelled as M7-M5.79
Additionally, they offer useful guidance on the minimum quality of data for the sub-population: a
minimum annual exposure of 20,000–25,000 lives over at least 8–10 years,80 although Bayesian
methods offer the potential to relax these criteria somewhat (e.g. Chen et al., 2017, Cairns et al.,
2011b, 2017a).
9.4. Process-Based and Causal Models
9.4.1. Until recently, these classes of models were not widely used, since the relationships between
biomedical and causal factors and underlying death rates were not sufﬁciently well understood and
because the underlying data needed to build the models were unreliable. This has begun to change.
76 The Li and Lee model commonly predicts perfect correlation between future (log) death rates in two
populations at very different ages. Biologically, this is highly implausible.
77 The study uses the common assumption that individual deaths follow a Poisson distribution. If one of the
populations is relatively small, Chen et al. (2017) show that the standard two-stage maximum likelihood (in
contrast to the one-stage Bayesian) approach produces highly biased estimates of the period effect volatilities.
78 See Hunt & Blake (2018) for a superior set of identiﬁcation conditions for estimating the gravity model.
79 Model M7 is used to model the principal population, while model M5 is used to model the spread between
the second population and the principal population.
80 Referring back to the ﬁnal sentence in paragraph 9.3.1, while multi-population modelling is essential for
index-based hedging, this can only really be done in big plans. It is also the case that it is only such big plans that
have access to bespoke products due to their size.
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9.4.2. In 2012, RMS launched a series of mortality indices and models via a platform called RMS
LifeRisks. The platform allows life insurance companies and pension funds in the UK, the USA,
France, Germany, Holland and Canada to model and manage their exposure to longevity and
mortality risks, taking into account recent medical research and social change projections. There are
two principal models.81
9.4.3. The ﬁrst model is the RMS longevity risk model. This is the base model used to project
mortality and variations in mortality during normal conditions when there are no extreme mortality
events. The projections depend on a number of so-called “vitagion categories” or individual sources
of mortality improvement (see Figure 13). The ﬁve categories used by RMS are: lifestyle trends,
including smoking prevalence; health environment; medical intervention; regenerative medicine, such
as stem cell research, gene therapy and nanomedicine; and the retardation of ageing, including
telomere shortening and caloric restriction.
9.4.4. The second model is the RMS infectious diseases model. This is used to estimate the additional
mortality arising from the outbreak of certain infectious diseases, e.g. pandemic inﬂuenza. Both
models were used in pricing the Kortis bond (see section 5.2) and an outbreak of something like
inﬂuenza would be the most likely reason for the attachment point being reached during the life of
the bond.
9.4.5. Academic researchers have recently begun experimenting with the introduction of causal
variables in their mortality models (e.g. Hanewald, 2011; Gaille & Sherris, 2011; Alai et al., 2014a;
Villegas & Haberman, 2014; Gourieroux & Lu, 2015; Cairns et al., 2017a). Practitioners also
started to use post code as a measure of socio-economic class (SEC) in their proprietary mortality
models, especially for pricing annuities. An early example is Richards (2008).
Figure 13. Timeline into the future
Note: Structural modelling of medical-based mortality improvement explores the timing,
magnitude and impact of different phases of new medical advances on the horizon.
Source: RMS (2010) “Longevity Risk.”
81 It is worth pointing out that, unlike the extrapolative or time series models, the RMS models have never
been published or subject to independent peer review.
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9.4.6. In 2008, Club Vita, a UK longevity data and analytics company, was set up with the express
purpose of improving the socio-economic modelling of mortality data, allowing the segmentation of
projections by SEC. To illustrate, cancer mortality related to smoking (such as larynx, oropharynx,
oral cavity and lung) is more commonly associated with the lowest SEC, while cancer mortality
related exposure to the sun (malignant melanoma) is more commonly associated with the highest
SEC. Segmented longevity trend models have improved in recent years as a result of new insights
from medical science and a greater understanding of cause of death for each SEC. The beneﬁts of this
to a pension plan have been an improved (and sometimes lower) best estimate of life expectancy (due
to a more accurate socio-economic breakdown of the plan’s membership) with less uncertainty in the
base table. The beneﬁts to an insurer seeking new business have been reﬁned pricing, better
assessment of diversiﬁcation, more effective risk selection, and increased competitiveness (Baxter &
Wooley, 2017). However, there is still an ongoing debate around using trend assumptions by SEC.
For example, Jon Palin of Barnett Waddingham argues: “The evidence is less clear on the level of
historical mortality improvements in pension schemes and other segments of the population, and to
what extent a different assumption should be made for them.”82
9.4.7. The emergence of new multi-population datasets with socio-economic subdivisions is also
beginning to offer much greater potential for the development of reliable and robust multi-
population models. For example, Cairns et al. (2017a) make use of Danish population data sub-
divided using a measure of afﬂuence that combines wealth and income, and utilising this data, they
develop a 10-population CBD-type stochastic model over the age range 55–94. With ten sub-
populations to analyse, they avoid excessive model complexity by assuming a relatively simple model
for correlations between sub-populations. A Bayesian framework is exploited to dampen the effect of
sampling variation that is inherent in the ten relatively small sub-populations. It is anticipated that in
the near future this and other datasets will become publicly available to allow researchers to develop
alternative models, as well as further road-testing existing models.
10. Applications of the Mortality Models
10.1. Overview
In this section, we introduce some applications of the extrapolative mortality models introduced in
the previous section: practical implementation of stochastic mortality models; determination of the
longevity risk premium; estimating regulatory capital relief with a hedge in place; and comparison of
alternative longevity risk management options. We begin by considering different types of users of
these models.
10.2. Users of Stochastic Mortality Models
10.2.1. The following are potential users (directly or indirectly) of stochastic mortality models:
insurers and reinsurers; regulators (e.g. the PRA); pension plans; specialist and general investors;
actuaries and actuarial consultants; and software providers (e.g. Longevitas).
82 http://www.theactuary.com/features/2017/08/mortality-improvements-in-decline/
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10.2.2. Insurers and reinsurers have a variety of reasons for using stochastic mortality models.
Arguably, the principal reason is that they form part of an overall package of good enterprise risk
management alongside stochastic models for other major risks, all augmented by a range of
appropriate stress and scenario tests. Insurers can then use stochastic models to assess their economic
capital requirements. Closely linked to this, many insurers are moving towards the use of stochastic
models to assess regulatory capital requirements. For example, the PRA strongly encourages the use
of stochastic mortality models with the standard one-year horizon under Solvency II (Prudential
Regulatory Authority, 2015, 2016). Multi-population models also offer the potential for insurers to
assess the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts resulting from exposure to different portfolios of lives (males/
females, smokers/non-smokers, assurances/annuities, multi-country, etc.), with subsequent reduc-
tions, for example, in regulatory capital. Lastly, insurers might wish to use stochastic models to
compare different options for the management of longevity risk. Depending on in-house capability,
insurers might develop their own suite of stochastic mortality models, or use external expertise. This
might come in the form of ready-to-use mortality software that is employed in-house by appro-
priately trained staff, or by contracting external consultants to perform stochastic analyses.
10.2.3. Regulators will not, typically, be direct users of stochastic mortality models. However, they
do need to be sufﬁciently knowledgeable in their use (including awareness of the assumptions and
limitations of each model) in order to be able to assess how they are being used by life insurers.
Additionally, they need to be able to give periodic guidance on the use of stochastic models,
including which models are, or are not, acceptable (see, for example Prudential Regulatory
Authority, 2015, 2016).
10.2.4. The acceptance of systematic longevity risk will, in general, form part of the core risk taking
activity of an insurer up to a level that is consistent with its overall risk appetite. In contrast,
acceptance of longevity risk is not generally part of the core business of the typical sponsor of an
occupational pension plan (nor indeed is investment and interest-rate risk). Nevertheless, systematic
longevity risk is present and therefore requires careful attention. Large pension plans have the
resources to assess their exposure to longevity risk through the use of both stochastic modelling and
deterministic scenarios: again as part of a wider programme of integrated risk management. As with
insurers, this might be done in-house, but more often this would be a service provided by the plan’s
actuarial advisers. Smaller pension plans are less likely to have the ﬁnancial resources to carry out a
full stochastic assessment of longevity risk. However, there is the potential for the longevity risk
research community to develop a small range of deterministic longevity scenarios (expressed as
adjustments to the preferred best estimate forecast) that capture the essence of realistic extreme
stochastic scenarios. On the other hand, consultancies now tend to have fairly streamlined processes
for running off stochastic projections in order to illustrate the magnitude of each element of the
longevity risk; these would typically be based on simpliﬁed pension beneﬁts but would additionally
reﬂect the most important aspects of the scheme, such as membership age, gender, and pension
amounts. Such scenarios and projections should contrast favourably with the poorly formulated
20% stress test required under Solvency II (see Cairns & El Boukfaoui, 2018). Models, therefore, can
help plans determine appropriate target funding levels and contribution rates, as well as assess the
risks associated with meeting these targets. Finally, as remarked earlier, use of stochastic models is
recommended as a way to help choose between alternative longevity risk management options
(including retention of the risk).
10.2.5. Pension plans also need to assess the potential future funding levels that might result from
future uncertain investment returns, interest rate changes and changes in longevity. Stochastic
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mortality models can be used as part of a larger internal modelling exercise to assess uncertainty in
funding levels. Larger plans will have the resources to carry out such an exercise. For smaller plans,
stochastic models can again be used by actuarial consultants to generate a small number of deter-
ministic extreme scenarios that can be applied to a range of smaller pension plans.
10.2.6. Specialist and general investors in longevity risk (e.g. ILS investors, hedge funds, private
equity investors, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and family ofﬁces) and other receivers of
longevity risk (e.g. reinsurers) are only likely to invest in this risk if it offers an acceptable risk
premium, taking into account the low correlation between longevity risk and ﬁnancial market risks
and hence the potential diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from including longevity-linked products in an
investment portfolio. This will be reﬂected in the price of the transaction at the outset relative to a
best estimate or expected value. A rigorous approach to this requires a set of stochastic models to
assess how much risk there is around the expected payoff.83 In a competitive market, the size of
the risk premium will reﬂect each potential investor’s other exposures: for example, a reinsurer might
be satisﬁed with a lower risk premium for longevity risk if they have offsetting life assurance
exposures.
10.3. Practical Implementation of Stochastic Mortality Models
10.3.1. It is common practice in the UK to use different methodologies for setting central forecasts
and for risk assessment around that central forecast. For example, life insurers might use the
CMI_2016 model (formally known as the CMI mortality projection model, calibrated using data up
to 2016) to frame their central forecast and calculate best estimate liabilities. They then follow PRA
guidelines (Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2015, 2016) and use stochastic mortality models to
assess, proportionately, how much risk there is around that best estimate (Cairns et al., 2017b). The
use of CMI_2016 allows users some control over future improvement rates and, in key elements,
requires the exercise of sound judgement (e.g. in setting the long-term rate of improvement). This
contrasts with the more objective statistical approach prevalent in stochastic mortality modelling.
Under the stochastic approach, the central forecast is determined by: the choice of model; the choice
of time series model (or equivalent) for forecasting period and cohort effects; and the historical
calibration period. These elements are ones that can be chosen objectively using standard statistical
methods (see, for example Cairns et al., 2009; Richards et al., 2017). No further judgement is
required once these selections have been made.
10.3.2. Current research is attempting to close the gap between the two approaches. For example,
Richards et al. (2017) focus on the Age Period Cohort Improvements (APCI) model that underpins the
historical calibration of the CMI_2016 model, and propose a coherent stochastic approach for fore-
casting. On the other hand, Cairns et al. (2017b) discuss an approach that closes the gap between the
CMI central forecast and the mean trajectory under the objective statistical approach. This involves
giving the user some control over setting the short and long term central trends in the period
and cohort effects in a stochastic model. With some minor constraints applied to the historical cali-
bration of the CMI model, the adapted stochastic model and the CMI_2016 projections can produce
consistent central forecasts, allowing users to place greater reliance on the outputs of the
stochastic model.
83 In order to deal with model risk.
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10.4. Determining the Longevity Risk Premium
10.4.1. As just discussed, the provider of any longevity hedge requires a premium to assume long-
evity risk. This means that the forward rate agreed at the start of any q-forward contract will be
below the anticipated (expected) mortality rate on the maturity date of the contract. Similarly, the
implied forward life expectancy in any longevity swap will be higher than the anticipated (expected)
life expectancy. Figure 14 shows a typical relationship between the expected and forward mortality
rate curves and the risk premium for a particular cohort currently aged 65.84 Figure 15 shows the
same for a particular age (in this case 65-year-old English & Welsh males) for years 2005–2025: the
further into the future, the more uncertainty there is in the mortality rate and the bigger the risk
premium.
10.4.2. As remarked above, a stochastic model can be used to assess how much uncertainty there is
in the underlying hedge instrument, and then this information can be used to determine an appro-
priate risk premium. There are different approaches to setting the price, for example: discounting the
expected payoff at an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate that reﬂects the assessed level of risk; or
calculating a risk-adjusted expected payoff prior to discounting at the risk-free rate. When applied to
the pricing of multiple contracts, not all frameworks will produce consistent prices over a range of
contracts and maturities. However, the method of risk adjustment proposed by Cairns et al. (2006)
using an explicit market price of risk for each period effect and for each year is one that does
guarantee pricing consistency. This can be used to determine what might be thought of as mid-
market prices, around which participants in the market can set buying and selling prices that reﬂect
the degree of market illiquidity.
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Figure 14. Cohort expected and forward mortality rate curves for a cohort currently aged 65 and
q-forward maturity at age 75
Note: Lines are illustrative only.
Source: Adapted from Loeys et al. (2007, Chart 9).
84 Loeys et al. (2007) relate the forward mortality rate to the expected mortality rate through the formula
qf = (1−T.γ.σ)qe, where qf is the forward mortality rate, qe is the expected mortality rate, T is the time to
maturity, σ is the volatility (annualised standard deviation) of changes in the mortality rate, and γ is the annualised
Sharpe ratio required by the counterparty (sometimes also referred to as the market price of risk).
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10.5. Estimating Regulatory Capital Relief
10.5.1. In section 7.2 above, we discussed regulatory capital. Under Solvency II, an insurer’s reg-
ulatory capital can be reduced if its liabilities are appropriately hedged.
10.5.2. This necessitates bringing the relevant regulatory authority on board sooner rather than
later, as experience in the Netherlands shows. The Dutch ﬁnancial regulator, the Dutch National
Bank (DNB), assesses longevity hedges on a case-by-case basis. A particular case is insurance,
pensions and investments ﬁrm Delta Lloyd’s two index-based longevity hedges.85 Delta Lloyd
had its Solvency II capital ratio reduced by 14 percentage points at the end of 2015 following
“intense discussions.” This was due to a disagreement with the DNB about the inclusion of risk
margin relief on the two longevity hedges beyond the duration of the hedges. The DNB treats
an index-based hedge as a ﬁnancial instrument, whereas it treats a customised hedge as a
reinsurance contract. It wanted the index-based hedges to be restructured to “ensure reinsurance
treatment,” otherwise Delta Lloyd faced a further 7 percentage points deduction from its
Solvency II ratio.
10.5.3. In June 2016, the DNB clariﬁed its position. It agreed that for an index-based swap, capital
relief will be proportional to the risk transfer. However, it felt that some previous index-based deals
had been of too short duration, too out-of-the-money and not a good match for actual liabilities.86
10.5.4. A detailed account of how to calculate regulatory capital relief in a longevity hedge can be
found in Cairns and El Boukfaoui (2018).87 They describe a ﬂexible framework that blends practical
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Figure 15. Expected and forward mortality rate curves for 65-year-old English & Welsh males,
2005–2025
Note: Lines are illustrative only.
Source: Adapted from Coughlan (2007a).
85 See section 11 below.
86 See: Pigott & Walker (2016); Solvency II Troubleshoot: Longevity Swaps and Risk Margin Relief,
InsuranceERM, 17 May 2016; https://www.insuranceerm.com/analysis/solvency-ii-troubleshoot-longevity-
swaps-and-risk-margin-relief.html
87 With or without regulatory capital requirements, their methodology can be applied equally well (and,
arguably, more cleanly) to economic capital relief using an insurer’s own economic capital framework and risk
appetite.
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issues with current academic modelling work. Key elements include careful assessment of basis risk,
subdivided into population basis risk and other sources. They then consider a speciﬁc longevity
hedge with a call option spread payoff structure and analyse the impact on regulatory capital. A
key conclusion is that the balance between population basis risk and other sources of basis risk
(especially structural basis risk) is highly dependent on the exhaustion point of the underlying
option. For example, in a Solvency II setting, if the exhaustion point is close to the 99.5% quantile
of the underlying risk, the recognition of population basis risk can have a signiﬁcant effect on the
regulatory capital required. In contrast, if the exhaustion point is somewhat below the 99.5%
quantile (e.g. 95%), then population basis risk has a negligible impact on the amount of regulatory
capital relief.88 In the latter case, therefore, the index-based hedge acts in a very similar way to a
reinsurance arrangement with similar attachment and exhaustion points in terms of its impact on
regulatory capital. The authors conclude that hedgers need to consider carefully the terms of an
index-based hedge (in the case considered, the attachment and exhaustion points and the maturity
date), to ensure the best outcome. Further, in light of the evidence in the previous two paragraphs,
insurers should discuss their plans with their local regulator before proceeding with a hedge.
Bearing this in mind, Cairns & El Boukfaoui (2018) outline a clear set of steps that can be used to
document regulatory capital relief calculations with the recommendation that these steps be fol-
lowed as a way to facilitate discussions with local regulators. This includes a requirement to
document clearly the structure of the two-population stochastic mortality model, how this is
calibrated, how death rates get extrapolated to high ages, and how central forecasts will be
determined at future valuation dates incorporating new information up to that valuation date.
10.6. Comparison of Risk Management Options
Good risk management practice includes consideration of a variety of viable options for reducing
exposure to longevity risk, and stochastic models have a key quantitative role, alongside qua-
litative criteria, in the process that leads to choosing one option over another. Cairns (2014)
outlines some of the issues. The stochastic model can be used in a consistent way to evaluate a
hedger’s longevity risk proﬁle with and without each of the hedging options in place. The range
of options itself might be constrained by the size of the liability to be hedged (for example
customised longevity swaps have typically been restricted to larger pension plans) but should, in
the ﬁrst instance, include both customised and index-based hedges. Any analysis should also take
into account a hedger’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Once residual risk has been evaluated, the
hedger is then in a position to compare the different options. This should take into account the
hedger’s general risk appetite as well as the underlying premium for a hedge (section 10.4) and
future requirements for adjustments to the hedge (e.g. a buy-in used prior to a full buy-out).
Cairns (2014) discusses, in a stylised fashion, how these multiple inputs can result in different
ﬁnal decisions: one size does not ﬁt all.89
88 For the examples in Cairns & El Boukfaoui (2018) if the exhaustion point is at the 99.5% quantile, the
inclusion of population basis risk can reduce regulatory capital relief by around 15% to 20%. In contrast, if the
exhaustion point is at the 95% quantile, the impact on regulatory capital relief of population basis risk is
effectively zero as the hedge always pays off in full in the most extreme 0.5% of scenarios.
89 For example, a highly risk averse hedger will normally opt for a customised hedge, whereas a hedger with a
greater appetite for risk might favour an index-based hedge if the price is right.
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11. Developments in the Longevity Risk Transfer Market Since 2006
11.1. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the global longevity de-risking market began in
the UK in 2006. Prior to this time, the UK market was dominated by two life assurers, Prudential90
and L&G, which did business of approximately £2bn a year across a large number of small
transactions. The total potential size of the UK market alone is around £2.7trn (on a buy-out basis)
and this encouraged a raft of new players, in particular mono-line insurers, to enter the market.91
The ﬁrst of these was Paternoster, but others quickly followed including Pension Insurance Cor-
poration (PIC), Synesis92 and Lucida,93 all of which were backed by investment banks and private
equity investors. In 2007, Goldman Sachs established its own pension insurer, Rothesay Life.
Paternoster94 executed the ﬁrst buy-out in November 2006 of the Cuthbert Heath Family Plan, a
small UK plan with just 33 members. It also executed the ﬁrst pensioner buy-in with Hunting PLC in
January 2007.95
11.2. The world’s ﬁrst publicly announced longevity swap between Swiss Re and the UK life ofﬁce
Friends’ Provident in April 2007 (although this was structured as an insurance or indemniﬁcation
contract rather than a capital market transaction). 2007 also saw the release of the LifeMetrics
Indices covering England & Wales, the US, Holland and Germany by J. P. Morgan, the Pensions
Institute and Willis Towers Watson (WTW) (then Towers Watson).96 Xpect Age and Cohort Indices
were launched in March 2008 by Deutsche Börse.97 These indices cover, respectively, life expectancy
at different ages and survival rates for given cohorts of lives in England & Wales, the USA, Holland
and Germany and its regions. The purpose of these indices is to provide a benchmark for the trading
of longevity-linked instruments. In 2009, longevity swaps began to be offered to the market based on
Deutsche Börse’s Xpect Cohort Indices.
11.3. The world’s ﬁrst capital market derivative transaction, a q-forward (or mortality forward)
contract,98 between J. P. Morgan and the UK pension fund buy-out company Lucida, took place in
January 2008. The world’s ﬁrst capital market longevity swap was executed in July 2008: Canada
Life hedged £500m of its UK-based annuity book (purchased from the defunct UK life insurer
Equitable Life). This was a 40-year swap customised to the insurer’s longevity exposure to 125,000
annuitants. The longevity risk was fully transferred to investors, which included hedge funds and ILS
funds. J. P. Morgan acted as the intermediary and assumes counter-party credit risk. In August 2011,
ITV, the UK’s largest commercial TV producer, completed a £1.7bn bespoke longevity swap with
Credit Suisse for its £2.2bn pension plan: the cost of the swap is reported as £50m (3% of the
notional swap value).99 In February 2010, Mercer launched a pension buy-out index for the UK to
90 We will use Prudential to refer to the UK-based insurer.
91 The timing was motivated by a number of external factors, such as a strengthened funding standard,
increased accounting transparency of pension liabilities on corporate balance sheets, the establishment of the PPF
with risk-based levies that depended on the size of plan deﬁcits, and the beginning of the closure of deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans.
92 Acquired by PIC in 2008.
93 Acquired by L&G in 2013.
94 Acquired by Rothesay Life in 2011.
95 See Appendix A for a list of publicly announced UK buy-ins above £100m between 2007 and 2016.
96 Coughlan et al. (2007c).
97 www.deutsche-boerse.com/xpect_e
98 Coughlan et al. (2007b).
99 https://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2104113/gbp17bn-itv-deal-predicted-
spark-longevity-swaps-surge
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track the cost charged by insurance companies to buy out corporate pension liabilities: at the time of
launch, the cost was some 44% higher than the accounting value of the liabilities,100 which high-
lights the attraction of using cheaper alternatives, such as longevity swaps, to transfer longevity.101
11.4. On 1 February 2010, the Life and Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) was established in
London. Its current members are Aviva, AXA, Deutsche Bank, J. P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley,
Prudential, and Swiss Re. LLMA was formed to promote the development of a liquid market in
longevity- and mortality-related risks.
11.5. This market is related to the ILS market and is also similar to other markets with trend risks,
e.g. the market in inﬂation-linked securities and derivatives. LLMA aims to support the development
of consistent standards, methodologies and benchmarks to help build a liquid trading market needed
to support the future demand for longevity protection by insurers and pension funds. In April 2011,
the LifeMetrics indices were transferred to LLMA with the aim of establishing a global benchmark
for trading longevity and mortality risk.
11.6. In December 2010, building on its successful mortality catastrophe Vita bonds and taking into
account the lessons learned from the failed EIB/BNP longevity bond, Swiss Re launched an 8-year
longevity-spread bond valued at $50m. To do this, it used a special purpose vehicle, Kortis Capital,
based in the Cayman Islands. As with the mortality bonds, the longevity-spread bonds are designed
to hedge Swiss Re’s own exposure to mortality and longevity risk. In particular, holders of the
bonds face a reduction in principal if there is an increase in the spread between mortality
improvements in 75–85-year-old English & Welsh males and 55–65-year-old US males, indicating
that Swiss Re has life insurance (mortality risk) exposure in the USA and pension (longevity risk)
exposure in the UK.102
11.7. The world’s ﬁrst longevity swap for non-pensioners (i.e. for active and deferred members of a
pension plan) took place in January 2011, when J. P. Morgan executed a £70m 10-year q-forward
contract with the Pall (UK) pension fund. This was a value swap designed to hedge the longevity risk
in the value of Pall’s pension liabilities, rather than the longevity risk in its pension payments as in the
case of cash ﬂow swaps – which have been the majority of the swaps that have so far taken place.
Longevity risk prior to retirement is all valuation risk: there is no cash ﬂow risk and most of the risk
lies in the forecasts of mortality improvements at speciﬁc future valuation dates. Further, the
longevity exposure of deferreds is not well deﬁned as a result of the options that plan members have.
11.8. In 2011, WTW introduced the pension captive structure. A plan executes a pensioner buy-in
with a standard insurer,103 but then the insurer reinsures the buy-in with a captive insurer owned by
100 https://www.uk.mercer.com/newsroom/global-buyout-index.html. In October 2017, the cost was 39%
higher (Mercer Global Pension Buyout Index December 2017, https://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/
attachments/global/Retirement/monthly-report/gl-2017-mercer-global-pension-buyout-index-december.pdf)
101 The buy-out ofﬂoads all risks (i.e. including investment, inﬂation, interest rate and longevity risks) which
explains, in part, the higher costs. A closer comparison to a longevity swap is a buy-in, since both just ofﬂoad
longevity risk. In October 2017, the cost of a buy-in was 13% higher than the accounting value of the liability and
7% higher than the funding value of the liability, reﬂecting the way that funding assumptions are generally closer
to best-estimate than accounting assumptions (Mercer Global Pension Buyout Index December 2017).
102 The Kortis bond was analysed in section 5.2 above and in more detail in Hunt & Blake (2015).
103 The standard insurer needs to be UK regulated, the captive is off-shore; the standard insurer will have the
modelling skills etc, while the captive is effectively an empty shell.
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the sponsor. Captives can provide a cost-effective solution compared with either a traditional buy-in
or directly running the plan over the longer term. This is because there can be a more efﬁcient
blending of investment management services with insurance, combined with a more effective dis-
aggregation of risks and hence a more capital-efﬁcient management of those risks. The ﬁrst plan to
use this structure was Coca Cola in 2011 (Willis Towers Watson, 2017).
11.9. In December 2011, Long Acre Life entered the market to offer cheaper pension insurance
solutions to larger plans with liabilities above £500m. Under these solutions, companies ofﬂoad their
pension plans to an insurance vehicle in which they also invest and so share the proﬁts along with
external investors: the target return is 15% p.a.104 In January 2012, L&G began offering longevity
insurance (in the form of deferred buy-ins) for the 1,000 or so smaller plans with liabilities in the
range £50-£250m. In February 2012, UK pension consultant Punter Southall adopted Pensions-
First’s pension liability and risk management software (PFaroe) to automate the production of
actuarial valuations and hence cut costs for pension plans, particularly small ones. In the same
month, another UK consultant Hymans Robertson, launched a pension de-risking monitoring service
which compares the costs of a full buy-out with the costs of a buy-in covering only pensioner
members and the costs of a longevity swap.
11.10. The ﬁrst pension risk transfers deals outside the UK took place in 2009–11. The ﬁrst buy-in
deal outside the UK was in 2009 in Canada; it was arranged by Sun Life Financial and valued at
C$50m. The ﬁrst buy-in deal in Europe was in December 2010 between the Dutch food manu-
facturer Hero and the Dutch insurer Aegon (€44m). The ﬁrst buy-in deal in the USA (valued at
$75m) took place in May 2011 between Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company and the Pru-
dential Insurance Co of America (PICA).105 The ﬁrst buy-out deal outside the UK was announced in
May 2011 and involved the C$2.5bn Nortel pension plan in Canada. In September 2011, CAM-
RADATA Analytical Services launched a new pension risk transfer (PRT) database for US pension
plans. The database provides insurance company organisational information, pension buy-in and
buy-out product fact sheets and screening tools, pricing data, up-to-date information on each PRT
provider’s ﬁnancial strength and relevant industry research. Users can request pension buy-in and
buy-out quotes directly from providers, including American General Life Companies, MetLife,
Paciﬁc Life, Principal Financial Group, PICA, Transamerica and United of Omaha.
11.11. The ﬁrst international longevity reinsurance transaction took place in June 2011 between
Rothesay Life (UK) and PICA (US) and was valued at £100m. The ﬁrst life book reinsurance swap
since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 also took place in June 2011 between Atlanticlux and
institutional investors and was valued at €60m.
11.12. In February 2012, Deutsche Bank (through its insurance subsidiary Abbey Life) executed a
huge €12bn index-based longevity swap for insurer Aegon in the Netherlands. This solution was
based on Dutch national population data and enabled Aegon to hedge the liabilities associated with a
portion of its annuity book (of €30bn). Deutsche Bank pays ﬂoating payments associated with the
realised mortality rates of the reference index, but these payments are capped and ﬂoored. Aegon
pays ﬁxed premiums. The maturity of the swap is 20 years. A commutation mechanism determines
104 This proposition failed to attract sufﬁcient commercial interest and the company was dissolved in
January 2016.
105 We will use PICA to refer to the US-based insurer, which is a Prudential Financial, Inc. company, as well
as Prudential Retirement and Prudential Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company (PRIAC).
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the payment at maturity – the mechanism is designed to provide longevity protection for liability
cashﬂows occurring beyond the 20-year maturity point. The swap has the structure of a series of call
option spreads each with a long out-of-the money call at a strike price (or ﬂoor) and a short out-of-
the money call at a higher strike price (or cap). Because the swap began deep out of the money (i.e.
the ﬂoor is considerably higher than initial mortality rates), the amount of longevity risk actually
transferred is far less than that suggested by the €12bn notional amount. Nonetheless, the key driver
for this transaction from Aegon’s point of view was the reduction in regulatory capital it achieved.
Most of the longevity risk has been passed to investors in the form of private bonds and swaps.106
11.13. In June 2012, General Motors Co. (GM) announced a massive deal to transfer up to $26bn of
pension obligations to PICA. This is by far the largest ever pension and longevity risk transfer deal
globally. The transaction is effectively a partial pension buy-out involving the purchase of a group
annuity contract for GM’s salaried retirees who retired before 1 December 2011 and refused a lump
sum offer in 2012. To the extent retirees accepted a lump sum payment in lieu of future pension
payments, the longevity risk was transferred directly to the retiree.107 The deal was classiﬁed as a
partial buy-out rather than a buy-in because it involved the settlement of the obligation. In other
words, the portion of the liabilities associated with the annuity contract will no longer be GM’s
obligation. Moreover, in contrast to a buy-in, the annuity contract will not be an asset of the pension
plan, but instead an asset of the retirees. In October 2012, Verizon Communications executed a
$7.5bn bulk annuity buy-in with PICA. The total buy-out deals market in the USA in 2012
amounted to $36bn.
11.14. The UK buy-outs for private sector pension plans had all involved plans that were closed to
future accrual. However, in March 2012, PIC executed the ﬁrst buy-out of a plan open to future
accrual: the sponsoring employer, the high-tech manufacturer Denso, will pay PIC an annual pre-
mium based on the number of active members and their salaries, but PIC will assume all the
liabilities. PIC had previously conducted an innovative buy-in in May 2011 with the London Stock
Exchange’s DB pension plan which not only insured current pensioner members, but will also
automatically insure active and deferred members when they reach retirement.
11.15. In June 2012, the OECD released the ﬁrst edition of Pensions Outlook. This called on
governments to kick-start the creation of a functioning longevity risk market and consider issuing
longevity bonds, without which the annuity market is unlikely to work well. In September 2012,
Swiss Re Europe released a report entitled A mature market: building a capital market for longevity
risk. The report called for the development of a capital market for longevity risk. It said that
“Society’s longevity risk could be tackled to a greater extent if reinsurers were able to expand their
capacity, and this could be done by encouraging capital market investors to invest in longevity
instruments. … The main challenges include achieving transparency in measuring the risk and
potential liability, building a secondary market, increasing investor education, providing the right
level of return and regulation.”108
11.16. In December 2012, the enhanced buy-in market opened for business in the UK for DB pension
plans. An enhanced buy-in is where a plan’s trustees buy a group annuity as an investment of the
plan, where some or all of the members covered by the policy are medically underwritten. Medical
106 https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0008/141587/Sagoo_Douglas_presentation.pdf
107 In fact, the lump sum was only offered to limited cohorts of plan members.
108 http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20120924_capital_market_longevity.html
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underwriting, which is now commonplace in the individual annuity market (i.e. in relation to DC
pensions), has the potential to reduce the cost to the plan of the longevity hedge compared with
standard annuities, on the grounds that certain members might have lower than average life
expectancy as a result of their lifestyle or some serious life-shortening illness. The market was
introduced by two specialist insurers, Partnership and Just Retirement, but other larger insurers
followed, e.g. L&G which offers a Large Individual Deﬁned Beneﬁt Annuity (LIBDA) service.
11.17. In February 2013, the ﬁrst medically underwritten bulk annuity (MUBA) transaction was
executed in the UK by Partnership (Harrison & Blake, 2013). This involved each member ﬁlling in a
medical questionnaire in order to get a more accurate assessment of their life expectancy based on
their medical history or lifestyle. This was particularly useful in the case of “top slicing,” where plan
trustees insure the pensioners (who will typically be the company directors) with the largest liabilities
and who therefore represent a disproportionate risk concentration for the plan. In December 2014,
Partnership executed a £206m medically underwritten bulk annuity transaction with a top slicing
arrangement for the £2bn Taylor Wimpey pension plan. L&G transacted a £230m medically
underwritten buy-in in December 2015 with the Kingﬁsher Pension Scheme, covering 149 high-value
members. The process of collecting medical information has been streamlined in recent years using
third-party medical data collectors, such as MorganAsh, Age Partnership and Aon’s AHEAD plat-
form – the ﬁrst two of which also perform MUMS (medically underwritten mortality studies). New
business more than doubled from £540m in 2014 to £1,200m in 2015, i.e. from 5% to 12.5% of
the market (Hunt & Blake, 2016). In April 2016, the two largest UK medical underwriters, Part-
nership and Just Retirement – which both entered the market in 2012 – merged to form Just valued
at £16bn. In December 2016, Just executed a £110m medically underwritten buy-in with the Land
Securities Group of Companies’ DB pension fund.
11.18. In April 2013, L&G reported its ﬁrst non-UK deal, the buy-out of a €136m annuity book
from New Ireland Life. In June 2013, the Canadian Wheat Board executed a C$150m pension buy-
in from Sun Life of Canada, involving inﬂation-linked annuities, while in March 2014, an unnamed
Canadian company purchased C$500m of annuities from an insurer reported to be Industrial
Alliance, making it the largest ever Canadian pension risk transfer deal to date.
11.19. In August 2013, Numerix, a risk management and derivatives valuation company, introduced
a new asset class called “life” on its risk modelling platform (in addition to equities, bonds and
commodities).
11.20. In September 2013, UK consultant Barnett Waddingham launched an insurer ﬁnancial
strength review service which provides information on an insurer’s structure, solvency position,
credit rating, and key risks in their business model. This service was introduced in response to
concerns about the ﬁnancial strength of some buy-out insurers.
11.21. In November 2013, SPX Corp. of Charlotte, NC, purchased a buy-out contract with
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. as part of a deal that moved $800m in pension obligations
off SPX’s balance sheet.
11.22. Also in November 2013, Deutsche Bank introduced the Longevity Experience Option (LEO).
It is structured as an out-of-the-money bull call option spread on 10-year forward survival rates and
has a 10-year maturity. The survival rates are based on males and females in ﬁve-year age cohorts
(between 50 to 79) derived from the England & Wales and Netherlands LLMA longevity indices.
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LEOs are traded over-the-counter under a standard ISDA contract. They allow longevity risk to be
transferred between pension funds, insurance companies and investors. They are intended to provide
a cheaper and more liquid alternative to bespoke longevity swaps which are generally costly and time
consuming to implement. Purchasers of the option spread, such as a pension fund, will gain if
realised survival rates are higher than the forward rates, but the gains will be limited, thereby
providing some comfort to the investors providing the longevity hedge. The 10-year maturity is the
maximum that Deutsche Bank believed investors will tolerate in the current stage in the development
of a market in longevity risk transfers. It was reported that Deutsche Bank executed its ﬁrst LEO
transaction with an ILS fund in January 2014.109
11.23. In December 2013, Aegon executed a second longevity risk transfer to capital markets
investors and reinsurers, including SCOR. Société Générale was the intermediary in the deal covering
liabilities of €1.4bn and RMS was the modelling agent. The main difference with the Deutsche Bank
hedge is that there will be a single payment by Société Générale to Aegon if the swap is in-the-money
at maturity (see section 5.5).
11.24. Also in December 2013, the Joint Forum reported on the results of its consultation on the
longevity risk transfer market. It concluded that this market is not yet big enough to raise systemic
concerns, but “their massive potential size and growing interest from investment banks to mobilise
this risk make it important to ensure that these markets are safe, both on a prudential and systemic
level” (Joint Forum, 2013, p.2).
11.25. In February 2014, the Mercer Global Pension Buy-out Index was introduced. It shows the
benchmark prices of 18 independent third-party insurers in four countries with signiﬁcant interest in
buying out DB liabilities: UK, USA, Canada and Ireland. Costs were highest in the UK where the cost
of insuring £100m of pension liabilities was 123% of the accounting value of the liabilities110 –
equivalent to a price of £32 per £1 p.a. of pension (Towers Watson, 2015). The comparable costs in
Ireland, the USA and Canada were 117%, 108.5% and 105%, respectively. The higher cost in the
UK is in part due to the greater degree of inﬂation uprating of pensions in payment in the UK
compared with the other countries. The difference between the USA and Canada is explained by the
use of different mortality tables. Rising interest rates (following the unwinding of global quantitative
easing programmes) and equity markets will lower funding deﬁcits and hence lead to lower buy-out
costs in future, especially in the USA.
11.26. In July 2014, Mercer and Zurich launched Streamlined Longevity Solution, a longevity swap
hedge for smaller pension plans with liabilities above £50m. This is part of a new Mercer SmartDB
service which provides bespoke longevity de-risking solutions and involves a panel of reinsurers led
by Zurich. It reduces the costs by having standardised processes for quantifying the longevity risk in
each pension plan. The ﬁrst deal, valued at £90m, was transacted with an unnamed UK pension plan
in December 2015. A second deal – this time with the UK pension plan of the Italian tyre company
Pirelli – was executed in August 2016 for £600m.
109 https://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/2305081/deutsche-bank-launches-
longevity-swap-alternative; http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2013/11/04/ﬁrst-longevity-experience-option-to-be-
traded-by-deutsche-bank-by-year-end/
110 Note from paragraph 11.3 above that the UK buy-out premium was 44% in February 2010 and 39% in
October 2017, indicating how volatile the premium can be and the importance of getting the timing of the buy-
out right to minimise costs.
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11.27. There is evidence of increasing demand from reinsurance companies for exposure to large
books of pension annuity business to offset the risk in their books of life insurance.111 For example,
in July 2014, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway agreed to a £780m quota-reinsurance deal with
PIC. Similarly, in August 2014, Delta Lloyd executed a 6-year index-based longevity swap covering
€12 billion of its longevity reserves with RGA Re,112 while AXA France executed a €750m longevity
swap with Hannover Re.
11.28. In March 2014, L&G announced the biggest single buy-out in the UK to date when it took on
£3bn of assets and liabilities from ICI’s pension plan, a subsidiary of AkzoNobel. The deal uses
“umbrella” contracts which enables the plan to add further liabilities onto the original contract.113
In December 2014, L&G announced the largest ever UK buy-in valued at £2.5bn with US manu-
facturer TRW. In fact, in 2014, TRW became the ﬁrst global corporation to simultaneously complete
three de-risking transactions in three different countries: the UK, the USA and Canada. Also in 2014,
the Aviva Staff Pension Scheme completed the ﬁrst limited recourse longevity swap, involving £5
billion in liabilities and 19,000 participants.
11.29. Around £13bn of bulk annuity deals were executed in the UK in 2014, the largest volume of
business since the de-risking market began in 2006 and beating the previous best year of 2008, just
before the GFC, when £7.9bn of deals were completed. The total volume of de-risking deals in the
UK in 2014 alone (covering buy-outs, buy-ins and longevity swaps) was £35bn. Included in this sum
is the UK’s largest transaction to date, namely the longevity swap for the British Telecom (BT)
Pension Scheme, covering £16bn of pension liabilities, arranged by PICA in July 2014. To complete
the transaction, the BT scheme created its own captive insurer located in Guernsey, which insured the
longevity risk. The captive insurer then reinsured the risk in a fully collateralised arrangement with
PICA. This was the world’s ﬁrst ever pension longevity captive transaction. Captive and limited
recourse transactions have dominated the market since.
11.30. In December 2014, WTW launched Longevity Direct, an off-shore longevity swap hedging
service that gives medium-sized pension plans with liabilities between £1–3bn direct access to the
reinsurance market, via its own cell (or captive) insurance company. This allows plans to bypass (or
pass through) insurers and investment banks – the traditional de-risking intermediaries – and sig-
niﬁcantly reduces transactions costs and completion times, while still getting the best possible
reinsurance pricing. The ﬁrst reported transaction on the Longevity Direct platform was the £1.5bn
longevity swap executed by the Merchant Navy Ofﬁcers Pension Fund (MNOPF) in January 2015
which was insured by MNOPF IC, a newly established cell insurance company based in Guernsey,
and then reinsured with Paciﬁc Life Re. In February 2015, PwC launched a similar off-shore
longevity swap service for pension plans as small as £250m. It uses a Guernsey-based incorporated
cell company called Iccaria, established by Artex Risk Solutions, to pass longevity risk directly on to
reinsurers. The arrangement is fully collateralised and each plan owns a cell within Iccaria which
again avoids the costs of dealing with insurer and investment bank intermediaries. WTW also
111 The biggest buyers of longevity risk at the present time are global reinsurers. Nevertheless, according to
Hannover Re: “The number of risk-takers is limited and there is not unlimited capacity in the market for taking
on longevity risk. The increasing worldwide demand for longevity cover will challenge the capacity for securing
longevity risk” (quoted in Punter Southall, 2015).
112 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2014/08/22/delta-lloyd-in-eur-12-billion-index-based-longevity-swap-with-
rga-re/
113 By October 2016, the ICI plan had completed 11 such deals – with L&G, Prudential (UK) and Scottish
Widows – with a total value of £8bn, saving the parent company over £100m in costs.
D. Blake et al.
52
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321718000314
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 25 Feb 2019 at 20:02:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
introduced the ﬁrst tracking software system to follow live insurer pricing, sending alerts when a plan
closes in on a target price.
11.31. In response to the announcement by the UK ﬁnance minister (George Osborne) in his Budget
Speech on 19 April 2014, that UK pension plan members no longer needed to buy annuities when
they retired (which resulted in an immediate fall in annuity sales of more than 50%), a number of
traditional annuity providers, such as Scottish Widows, reported that they were considering entering
the bulk annuity market.
11.32. In November 2014, the Longevity Basis Risk Working Group (2014) of the Institute &
Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) and LLMA published Longevity Basis Risk: A Methodology for
Assessing Basis Risk.114 This study develops a new framework for insurers and pension plans to
assess longevity basis risk. This, in turn, will enable simpler, more standardised and easier to execute
index-based longevity swaps to be implemented. Index-based longevity swaps allow insurers and
pension plans to offset the systemic risk of increased liabilities resulting from members living longer
than expected. It had hitherto been difﬁcult to assess how effectively an index-based longevity swap
could reduce the longevity risk in a particular insurance book or pension plan. The methodology
they developed is applicable to both large plans (which are able to use their own mortality data in
their models) and smaller plans (by capturing demographic differences such as socio-economic class
and deprivation). In May 2016, a follow-up study – carried out by Macquarie University, Mercer
Australia, and the University of Waterloo – was announced. The purpose was to design a “readily
applicable methodology” for use with longevity risk indices: “Such indices are often used in pension
beneﬁts and annuitant liabilities, as well as in providing actuaries with key data, …but the problem
of the existence of basis risk remains unsolved.” This follow-up study was published in December
2017 (Li et al., 2017). The report distinguishes between three types of basis risk (population,
sampling and structural basis risk) and takes the proposed models in the 2014 report through to full
analysis of hedge effectiveness. The report contains extensive numerical analyses that consider how
hedge effectiveness depends on a range of input variables, including different book populations, size
of book population, and type of hedge instrument, as well as the sensitivity to the underlying risk
measure itself.
11.33. In March 2015, the UK government announced that it would introduce a new competitive
corporate tax structure to allow ILSs to be domiciled in the UK. In May 2015, Rothesay Life, the
insurance company owned by Goldman Sachs, bought out the liabilities of Lehman Brothers’ UK
pension plan for £675m, thereby securing the pensions of former employees of the company
associated with the beginning of the GFC.
11.34. In April 2015, Swiss Re Capital Markets led the issuance of €285m of excess mortality
insurance-linked securities by Benu Capital Limited (Benu) on behalf of AXA Global Life. Swiss Re
Capital Markets underwrote the transaction via two classes of principal-at-risk variable rate notes
issued by Benu, an Irish private company incorporated with limited liability. The notes have a 5-year
risk period starting on 1 January 2015. The proceeds of the notes each collateralise a counterparty
contract with AXA Global Life, providing protection against excess mortality in France, Japan and
the US via country age and gender weighted population mortality indices. It was the largest excess
mortality issuance since 2007.115
114 A version of this report was subsequently published as Villegas et al. (2017).
115 http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20150428_large_excess_mortality_issuance.html
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11.35. The largest buy-out to date in the UK was for the Philips Pension Fund which in November
2015 completed a full buy-out of the pension beneﬁts of 26,000 members valued at £2.4bn with PIC.
An interesting feature of this deal was that a buy-out was combined with a longevity hedge. The
longevity risk was simultaneously reinsured with Hannover Re. Another interesting feature was that
it covered both retired and deferred members, with the latter’s beneﬁts valued at £1bn.
11.36. An important new longevity-linked product that recently took off in the UK was the equity
release mortgage. This allows individuals to release equity in their homes to fund their retirement
without downsizing. L&G, for example, set up L&G Home Finance for this purpose and in its ﬁrst
year completed more than £400m equity release mortgage sales. Since equity release contracts
typically involve a no negative equity guarantee,116 the product provider is exposed to the risk that
mortgagors live longer than expected.
11.37. In 2015, L&G directly entered both the USA and European pension risk transfer markets. It
executed a $450m transaction with the US subsidiary of Royal Philips covering 7,000 plan members
in October and a €200m deal with ASR Nederland NV, a Dutch insurer in December. The pension
obligations were transferred to L&G Re in cooperation with Hannover Re. L&G said: “The pension
risk transfer market has become a global business…The potential market for pension risk transfer in
the US, UK and Europe is huge, and will play out over many decades.” Two US insurers were also
involved in the Royal Philips deal: PICA acquired $450m of plan liabilities covering another 7,000
members, while American United Life Insurance Company issued annuity contracts to 3,000
deferred plan members, valued at $200m.
11.38. In January 2015, the Bell Canada Pension Plan executed a C$5bn longevity swap with Sun
Life Financial,117 SCOR, and RGA Re; it was SCOR’s ﬁrst transaction in North America. In the
process, Canada became the ﬁrst country apart from the UK to have all three pension risk transfer
solutions actively in use. In the same year, it completed its ﬁrst inﬂation-linked buy-in annuity
transaction, while in 2017 it completed its ﬁrst buy-in annuity covering active future beneﬁts.118 In
June 2015, Delta Lloyd did a second €12bn longevity swap with RGA Re: the swap was also index-
based, with an 8-year duration and had a notional value of €350m.119 In July 2015, Aegon did one
valued at €6bn with Canada Life Re, a new entrant to the de-risking market in 2015. Another new
entrant was Scottish Widows.
11.39. In June 2015, the Mercer Pension Risk Exchange was launched. It gives clients in the USA,
UK and Canada up to date buy-in and buy-out pricing based on their plan’s data. It collects prices
provided monthly by insurers in the bulk market, based on plan beneﬁt structures and member data.
Mercer said: “Many companies have the appetite to transfer pension risk off their balance sheet, but
they face barriers: lack of clear information about the true cost of a buy-in or buy-out, limited
transparency, the ﬂuctuation of market rates and plan economics to name but a few. [The exchange
will enable] sponsoring employers and trustees to be more strategic and sophisticated in their
116 That is, the amount that the individual or their estate (if the individual dies) needs to repay (i.e., amount
borrowed plus accrued interest) cannot exceed the equity in the home.
117 Sun Life Financial uses the RMS Longevity Risk Model, which RMS describes as a ‘structural meta-model
of geroscience advancement’.
118 Eckler Consultants (2017) Pension Risk Transfer Report, November.
119 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2015/06/26/delta-lloyd-rga-in-second-e12-billion-longevity-swap-deal/
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approach and to know that they are executing a buy-in or a buy-out at the best time for them and at
a competitive price.”
11.40. In April 2016, WTW released PulseModel which uses medical science and the opinions of
medical experts to improve longevity predictions. For example, the model predicts that 16% of 50-
year-old men in the UK will develop type-2 diabetes in the next 20 years, but this rises to 50% for
those who are both obese and heavy smokers. Overall, the model predicts that longevity improve-
ments in the future will be lower than currently predicted, at around 1% p.a. rather than 1.5%. If
this turned out to be correct, then the current price of longevity of risk transfer products would be
too high.
11.41. In 2016, there were a total of £8.6bn in buy-outs and buy-ins and £1.6bn in longevity
swaps.120
11.42. The largest buy-in in 2016 (in December) was Phoenix Life’s £1.2bn buy-in for the 4,400
pensioners in the PGL Pension Scheme, which is sponsored by the Phoenix Group, Phoenix Life’s
parent company. This replaced a longevity swap it had set up for the plan in 2014. This is the ﬁrst
example of a transaction which transforms a longevity swap into a bulk annuity. Phoenix Life saw
this as an opportunity to bring £1.2bn of liquid assets (mostly UK government bonds) onto its
balance sheet, which could then be swapped into a higher yielding, matching portfolio, structured to
maximise the capital beneﬁt under Solvency II. This, in turn, meant that Phoenix Life would be
assuming the market risks associated with the PGL scheme pension liabilities in addition to the
longevity risks – and already does this on its existing book of individual annuities which are backed
by £12bn of assets. The timing was also critical. Phoenix wanted to ensure that its internal model
under Solvency II had bedded down well and that the capital and balance sheet impacts of the
transaction were well understood, and that Phoenix had elicited the full support of the PRA for the
transaction, thereby ensuring execution certainty. Phoenix also provided comfort to the plan’s
trustees by giving them “all-risks” cover from point of buy-in (“all-risks” cover is not usually
provided until buy-out) and strong collateral protection.121
11.43. 2016 saw the beginning of a trend towards consolidation amongst insurance companies
involved in the longevity risk transfer business in the UK. For example, Aegon sold its £9bn UK
annuity portfolio to Rothesay Life122 and L&G between April and May, as part of a strategy to free
up capital from non-core businesses. Part of the reason for this is the additional capital requirements
under Solvency II.123 Similarly, in September, Deutsche Bank sold its Abbey Life subsidiary to
Phoenix Life – a consolidator of closed insurance books – for £935mn, as part of a planned pro-
gramme of disposals aimed at restoring its capital base. There is an estimated £100bn of UK
individual annuities in back books and further consolidation of these back books is anticipated.
120 Pensionfundsonline, 15 December 2016.
121 Stephanie Baxter (2017) How PGL’s longevity swap was converted into a buy-in, Professional Pensions,
10 April.
122 In August 2017, Goldman Sachs sold its remaining stake in Rothesay Life to a consortium comprising US
buy-out ﬁrm Blackstone, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund GIC, and US life insurer MassMutual in a deal
valuing Rothesay Life at around £2bn; http://www.cityam.com/269996/goldman-sachs-sells-ﬁnal-stake-2bn-
rothesay-life
123 Solvency II has increased capital requirements and has reduced the attractiveness of annuities as a business
line for certain insurers and raised buy-out prices by 5-7% (Financial News, 28 March–3 April 2016).
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In December 2017, L&G sold its £33bn closed book of traditional insurance-based pensions, savings
and investment policies to the ReAssure division of Swiss Re for £650m.
11.44. Solvency II has also been blamed for some companies pulling out of the bulk annuities
market altogether, a key example being Prudential in January 2016. Prudential is reported to be
selling a portion of its £45bn UK annuity and pension liability businesses due to an inadequate return
on capital and to transfer that capital to its growing businesses in Asia.124 Reinsurance deals have
also increased in response to Solvency II, involving non-EU reinsurers. For example, PIC executed a
£1.6bn longevity reinsurance agreement with PICA in June 2016.
11.45. 2016 also witnessed the increasing streamlining and standardisation of contracts. This is
particularly beneﬁcial to small plans below £100m. Previously, smaller plans have been less
attractive to insurers due to the higher costs of arranging such deals relative to the proﬁt earned. To
circumvent this, consultants have begun offering services that allow smaller plans to access improved
pricing and better commercial terms using a standardised off-the-shelf process incorporating pre-
negotiated legal contracts. Pricing is more competitive because the insurer’s costs are kept low. An
example is WTW’s Streamlined Bulk Annuity Service. The increasing maturity of the market has
meant that some larger plans have also been prepared to use pre-negotiated contracts (Willis Towers
Watson, 2017).
11.46. 2016 was also the tenth anniversary of the longevity transfer market. Since its beginning in
the UK in 2006, £40bn of buy-outs and £31bn of buy-ins have taken place in the UK, covering 1
million people.125 Yet this equates to just 5% of the £1.5trn of UK DB pension assets and 3% of the
£2.7trn of DB pension liabilities on a buy-out basis. In addition, 48 longevity swaps are known to
have been completed in the UK between 2007 and 2016, valued at £75bn and covering 13 insurance
companies’ annuity and buy-out books, 22 private sector pension funds, and one local authority
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Cumulative Pension Risk Transfer Totals by Country and Product
$22 bn
Canada All
Transactions
$101bn
UK Longevity
Swaps
$128bn
UK Buy-outs
and Buy-ins
$115bn
US All
Transactions
Figure 16. Cumulative pension risk transfers by product and country, 2007–17
Sources: LIMRA, Hymans Robertson, LCP and PFI analysis as of December 31, 2017.
124 https://www.ftadviser.com/pensions/2016/12/05/prudential-seeks-buyers-for-45bn-annuity-business/
125 LCP, Professional Pensions (15 December 2016 and 26 January 2017). Since 2007, some 92 buy-ins have
been completed – see Table A1.
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pension fund (some of which executed more than one swap).126 Figure 16 shows the growth of the
global market in longevity risk transfer between 2007 and 2017. A total of $366bn in transactions
have been completed during this period.
11.47. At the beginning of 2017, there were eight UK-domiciled insurers actively participating in the
pension risk transfer market in the UK. The largest players are PIC and Legal & General, with
market shares of 37% and 30%, respectively. The others are Rothesay Life, Canada Life, Zurich,
Scottish Widows, Standard Life, and new entrant Phoenix (since August). Occasionally, the insurers
co-operate in a transaction. To illustrate, in August 2017, L&G executed a longevity swap in respect
of £800m of the pension liabilities of Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE), while PIC completed a
£350m buy-in for the company. Consultant LCP estimated that £12bn buy-ins and buy-outs took
place in 2017 and predicts that £15bn will take place in 2018, with total insurer capacity at £25bn:
“There remains signiﬁcant capacity and competition – even if a large back-book comes to market –
providing attractive opportunities for pension plans to transfer longevity risk through a buy-in or
buy-out.”127
11.48. One of the largest deals in 2017 (September) involved a £3.4bn longevity swap between the
Marsh & McLennan Companies (MMC) UK Pension Fund and both Canada Life Reinsurance and
PICA, using Guernsey-based incorporated cell companies, Fission Alpha IC Limited and Fission Beta
IC Limited. MMC subsidiary Mercer led the transaction as adviser to the pension fund trustee and
the deal was the ﬁrst to be completed using the Mercer Marsh longevity captive solution, with no
upfront premium. The two reinsurers shared the risk equally and the use of the captive ICC vehicle
meant that no insurer intermediary was required, making the deal more cost-effective for the pension
fund.128 Also in September, the British Airways’ Pension Scheme used a similar Guernsey-based
captive insurer to set up a £1.6bn longevity swap. The longevity risk was then reinsured with Partner
Re and Canada Life Re. The scheme had previously hedged £2.6bn of liabilities through two
longevity swap transactions executed by Rothesay Life in 2010 and 2011.129 In November 2017,
PIC executed a £900m longevity swap with PICA, while in December 2017, L&G executed a
£600m longevity swap with PICA.130
11.49. In December 2017, NN Life, part of the Nationale-Nederlanden Group, executed an index-
based longevity hedge with reinsurer Hannover Re, in a deal covering the insurer against the
longevity trend risk in €3bn of its liabilities. The structure is similar to the 2013 Aegon tail-risk deal
arranged by Société Générale and builds on subsequent work including Michaelson & Mulholland
(2014) and Cairns & El Boukfaoui (2018). While the term of the transaction is 20 years, NN Life is
protected over a longer time period via a commutation function131 that applies at maturity. If
126 www.artemis.bm/library/longevity_swaps_risk_transfers.html; see Table A2 for a full list of UK publicly
announced longevity swaps between 2007 and 2016.
127 https://www.lcp.uk.com/media-centre/press-releases/2017/08/buy-in-and-buy-out-volumes-nearly-double;
LCP (2018) Pension De-risking 2018.
128 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/09/14/mmc-pension-ofﬂoads-huge-3-4bn-of-longevity-risk-to-reinsurers.
The counter to this cost-effectiveness is that the hedger takes on additional counterparty risk. If a reinsurer fails then
there is no insurer to protect the pension scheme.
129 Nick Reeve (2017) BA scheme uses ‘captive insurer’ in £1.6bn longevity risk hedge, IPE, 13 September.
130 https://www.pensioncorporation.com/media/press-releases/Prudential, PIC Reach $1.2 Billion Longevity
Reinsurance Agreement; L&G reinsures £600m of longevity risk through Prudential, Professional Pensions, 21
December 2017.
131 See paragraph 5.5.5.
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longevity improvements have been much stronger than expected, this will be assumed to continue
until the liabilities run-off and NN will receive a payment under the hedge. The transaction helped to
reduce the solvency capital requirement of NN’s Netherlands life business by €35m. The index
attachment point for the hedge is close to NN’s best estimate, which helps maintain the SCR relief
and effective risk transfer over time.132,133
11.50. In April 2015, the UK government introduced “freedom and choice” pension reforms which
gave more ﬂexibility to how individuals could draw down their DC pension pots. In particular, there
was no longer a requirement to purchase an annuity.134 This immediately led to a fall in annuity
sales by more than 50%. The situation was not helped by the fall in gilt yields (which led to a
corresponding fall in annuity rates) arising from the government’s quantitative easing programme
introduced after the GFC. In August 2017, a 65-year old with a £100,000 pension pot, could get a
level income for life of £4,894: 2 years before, the amount would have been £5,292.135 By 2017, the
following insurers had pulled out of the open market for annuities: Aegon, LV= , Partnership (before
it merged with Just Retirement to form Just), Prudential, Standard Life, Friends Life (merged with
Aviva), Reliance Mutual, B&CE, and Retirement Advantage. This leaves just six providers left in
what was once the world’s largest annuity market: Aviva (offering standard and enhanced annuities),
Canada Life (standard and enhanced), Hodge Lifetime (standard only), Just (enhanced only), Legal
& General (standard and enhanced) and Scottish Widows (standard only).136
11.51. In order to reduce the costs of de-risking, pension plans are encouraged to perform some
liability reduction exercises, the key ones being:137
∙ Enhanced transfer values (ETVs) – allow deferred members to transfer an uplifted value of their
beneﬁts to an alternative arrangement. In August 2017, a 64-year old entitled to an index-linked
pension starting at £10,000 from age 65 would be offered a transfer value of £237,000, according
to the Xaﬁnity Tranfer Value Index.138
∙ Flexible retirement options (FROs) – allow deferred members aged 55 and over to retire early, or
to take a transfer value and secure beneﬁts in a different format from their plan beneﬁts, or to use
funds for drawdown purposes.
∙ Pension increase exchanges (PIEs) – allow pensioners to exchange non-statutory increases for a
higher immediate pension with lower or even zero future increases (e.g. a £10,000 annual pension
with RPI uplifting is replaced by a £12,000 annual pension with no further increases).
∙ Trivial commutations (TCs) – allow members with low value beneﬁts to cash these in.
The most common exercises currently in the UK are PIEs and TCs – and these can be conducted
either before or at the same time as a bulk purchase annuity broking exercise.
11.52. Innovation is a continuing feature of this market. Some examples include (see, e.g. Legal &
General & Engaged Investor, 2016):
132 http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2017/12/01/nn-life-gets-index-based-longevity-hedge-from-hannover-re/
133 https://www.nn-group.com/Investors/Capital-Markets-Day-2017.htm
134 https://www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk/about-pensions/pension-reform/freedom-and-choice
135 Josephine Cumbo, Pensioners hit as annuity rates drop 10% in two years, Financial Times, 1 September.
136 Source: Hargreaves Lansdown, August 2017.
137 Professional Pensions (2016) Risk reduction and the extent of trust in pension scheme advisers and
providers, June, p.26.
138 Hannah Godfrey (2017) DB transfer values back on the rise in August, Professional Adviser, 7 September.
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∙ Buy-ins and buy-outs with deferred premium payments – to spread costs.
∙ Phased de-risking using a sequence of partial buy-ins with an “umbrella” structure to avoid more
than one set of contract negotiations – to spread costs.
∙ Accelerated buy-ins – the insurer provides a loan to the plan equal to the deﬁcit (sometimes called a
windingup lump sum (WULS)), so that a partial buy-in can take place immediately,with this converting
to a full buy-in when the loan has been repaid, with the option of a full buy-out at a later date.
∙ Forward start buy-ins – a standard buy-in with the start date delayed to reﬂect the level of funding
available, with additional options, such as paying deferred members as and when they retire if this
is prior to the start date, or the ability to bring forward the start date for an additional fee.
∙ Automated bulk plan transfers – to reduce risks (introduced in November 2017 by Scottish
Widows and Standard Life).139
∙ Top-slice buy-ins – to target the highest value liabilities.
∙ Named-life longevity swap – if the named member lives longer than expected, the insurer pays out
the difference (examples being the £400m Bentley plan or an unnamed plan with 90 named
pensioners valued at £50m).
∙ Tranching by age – to reduce costs; according to consultant Punter Southall, a buy-in for
pensioners up to age 70 will make a subsequent buy-out within the following 10 years cheaper
than a buy-in for the over 70 s.140
∙ Longevity swaps for small pension plans with liabilities of £50–100m – previously only available
for medium (£100–500m) and large plans (above £500m).
∙ Novation – the ability to transfer a longevity hedge from one provider to another, thereby
introducing some liquidity into what had previously been a completely illiquid market. An
example would be the reinsurance of a small bulk annuity transaction. Contract simplicity is a
desirable feature of such arrangements.
∙ Longevity swap to buy-in conversions – as pioneered by Phoenix Life in December 2016 for its
parent company’s pension plan. Solvency II incentivises buy-in providers to hold longevity
insurance, otherwise they pay an additional risk margin. This encourages buy-in providers to seek
out plans which already have a longevity hedge and encourage them to do a buy-in. Another
driver is longevity swap providers that are not currently active in the market – such as J. P.
Morgan and Credit Suisse – but are still responsible for running off their existing swaps. They
might have an incentive to encourage the associated pension plan to novate the swap to a buy-in
provider and hence extinguish their liability.141
∙ Insuring away the extreme tail of liabilities in a closed plan after a speciﬁed term, such as 5 or 10
years – to reduce costs.
∙ Increasing optionality in contracts to improve ﬂexibility – for example, the option to switch the
indexation measure for pensions in payment from the Retail Price Index to the Consumer Price
Index if government legislation changes; or the option to secure discretionary beneﬁts, such as
actual inﬂation above a 5% cap; or surrender options.
139 Michael Klimes (2017) How the ﬁrst automated bulk scheme transfers happened, Professional Pensions,
10 November.
140 James Phillips (2017) DB schemes insuring wrong tranche of members in buy-ins, Professional Pensions,
14 August.
141 Stephanie Baxter (2017) Converting longevity swaps into bulk annuities: The next de-risking innovation?,
Professional Pensions, 13 April.
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∙ Combining liability management solutions (such as interest rate and inﬂation swaps, and ETV,
FRO and PIE exercises) and bulk annuities in a buy-out – so instead of completing liability
management before considering a buy-out, plans do this in a single exercise.
∙ “Buy-out aware” investment portfolios – used to reduce buy-out price volatility and close the
funding shortfall, with the buy-out price locked to the value of the buy-out aware funds once a
target shortfall has been reached and whilst the contract documentation for a buy-out is being
completed.
∙ Improved arrangements for handling data errors that arise after a deal has been executed – to
reduce pre-deal negotiation requirements and post-deal transaction uncertainty. Common data
errors include member gender, date of birth and beneﬁt amounts for both member and partner. A
simpliﬁed data error process could deal with these issues in the following way: locking down
beneﬁts, removing the need for re-pricing; mechanistically adjusting demographic errors; and
using due diligence to check for systematic errors with the data.142
∙ Arrangements to handle deferred members – to improve insurer appetite to assume the additional
risk and cost involved. Deferred lives make up almost half (45%) of the membership of UK DB
plans in the UK.143 They are much more expensive to hedge for a number of reasons. First, there
can be problems with their existence and identiﬁcation. Second, they enjoy a large number of
options which need to be priced.144 Third, their longevity risk is greater, because the longevity
improvement assumption used for pricing has greater reliance on the assumed long-run trend.145
Fourth, as a direct consequence of the previous points, more capital is needed and this, in turn,
increases the demand for reinsurance. These issues can be at least partially mitigated as follows: a
robust existence checking procedure is needed involving electronic tracing, assuming a ﬁxed
percentage of the pension is exchanged for tax-free cash, setting the assumed retirement date to the
plan’s normal retirement date, assuming no pension is exchanged for additional partner pension,
restricting the age proﬁle to older deferred members, and restricting the proportion of deferred
members in the transaction.146
11.53. These are all innovations in the space linking pension plans and insurance companies
designed to ease the transfer of pension liabilities (or at least the longevity risk in them) from pension
plans to insurance companies. But there is now an increasing sign of long-term capacity constraints
within insurance companies.147 As one consultant said: “Given the market has historically completed
only 150–200 deals in any one year, there is a real risk of capacity constraints in the market, not just
from an insurer capital perspective, but also from a resource and expertise perspective.”148
142 Andrew Murphy (2017) Developments in longevity swaps, Paciﬁc Life Re, 23 November, IFoA Life
Conference. Provided due diligence has been carried out at the outset, subsequent data errors tend to be unbiased
in terms of their impact and so average out close to zero.
143 That is 4.9m members (The Pension Regulator and the Pension Protection Fund, Purple Book 2015).
144 For example, lump sum commutation, trivial commutation, early/late retirement, increasing a partner’s
beneﬁts at the expense of the member’s beneﬁts, and pension increase exchanges.
145 Valuation and risk assessment of a deferred annuity can be broken down into ﬁve overlapping compo-
nents: survival to retirement; the socio-economic group of the pensioner at the date of retirement; the base
mortality table at the time of retirement for that socio-economic group; general mortality improvements (e.g. age
65 + ) up to the date of retirement; and the mortality improvement rate after retirement. Uncertainty in the
probability of survival to retirement will typically be quite small in relation to the other risks.
146 Andrew Murphy (2017) Developments in longevity swaps, Paciﬁc Life Re, 23 November, IFoA Life
Conference.
147 As mentioned in paragraph 11.47, there does not appear to be an immediate capacity constraint.
148 Martyn Phillips, Mercer (quoted in Professional Pensions (2016) Risk reduction and the extent of trust in
pension scheme advisers and providers, June, p.28).
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11.54. In April 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a new edition of its Global
Financial Stability Report. Chapter 2 (“Low Growth, Low Interest Rates, And Financial Intermedia-
tion”) suggests that DB pension funds across the globe might have to cut beneﬁts “signiﬁcantly” in the
long term because of ultra-low interest rates. Attempts to increase returns by changing asset allocations
“appears feasible only by taking potentially unacceptable levels of risk.” In the face of such low rates,
the IMF argues that “life insurers and pension funds would face a long-lasting transitional challenge to
proﬁtability and solvency, which is likely to require additional capital” or would require a “very high”
level of volatility risk to meet their funding goals. However, a combination of risk aversion and
regulatory constraints was likely to deter the vast majority from taking this second path. The IMF
instead believes that the current situation might work to the beneﬁt of insurers backing buy-ins and
buy-outs. With investors increasingly monitoring the size of DB liabilities and the effects on company
share prices, proﬁts and dividends, the IMF said ofﬂoading these liabilities to insurers “is an attractive
option” and “may represent a market-efﬁcient arrangement” and that “regulation could play an
important role in this area by facilitating such transactions.”
12. A Look into the Future: Potential Longevity Risk Transfer Solutions
12.1. Overview
A number of potential solutions were suggested in the 2006 Living with Mortality paper:
∙ Longevity bond types (e.g. zero-coupon longevity bonds, deferred longevity bonds, principal-at-
risk longevity bonds and longevity spread bonds).
∙ Mortality, longevity and annuity futures.
∙ Mortality options, longevity caplets and ﬂoorlets.
∙ Mortality swaptions.
These were direct translations from already existing capital market instruments, but so far none of
these, apart from a single longevity spread bond (i.e. Kortis) and a few longevity bull call spreads
constructed using longevity caplets and ﬂoorlets (e.g. the 2013 Aegon deal with Société Générale),
have been introduced in the longevity risk transfer market. In this section, we look at two potential
new solutions that might have a greater chance of being introduced in the near term.
12.2. Potential New Solution: Longevity-Linked Securities
12.2.1. A perceived problem with the EIB/BNP Paribas longevity bond was that the reference index
might not be sufﬁciently highly correlated with a hedger’s own mortality experience (as a result of
population basis risk). An alternative instrument – denoted a longevity-linked security (LLS)149 –
deals, at least partly, with this problem. The concept was inspired by the design of mortgage-backed
securities.
12.2.2. The LLS is built around a special purpose vehicle. Individual hedgers on one side of the
contract (e.g. a pension plan or an annuity provider) arrange longevity swaps with the SPV using
their own mortality experience at rates that are negotiated with the SPV manager. The swapped
149 These were ﬁrst discussed in Cairns et al. (2008).
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cashﬂows are then aggregated and passed on to the market. Bondholders gain if mortality is heavier
than anticipated.
12.2.3. It might be felt that the aggregate cashﬂows themselves lack transparency150 in which case
the SPV might link cashﬂows to an accepted reference index. The difference between this and the
aggregated swap cashﬂows is a basis risk that is borne by the SPV manager.
12.2.4. This type of arrangement is illustrated in Figure 17 where the intermediary in this case is a
reinsurer, which transacts customised longevity swaps with a set of hedgers. In this example, there
are three hedgers, A, B and C (but there could, of course, be many more). Hedger A wishes to swap
the risky longevity-linked cashﬂows LA(t) for a series of pre-determined cashﬂows. The agreement
with the SPV manager is to swap ﬂoating LA(t) for ﬁxed ~LAðtÞ for t=1,…,T, with the ﬁxed leg set at
a level that results in the swap initially having zero value at time 0. Similarly, hedger B swaps ﬂoating
LB(t) for ﬁxed ~LBðtÞ, and hedger C ﬂoating LC(t) for ﬁxed ~LCðtÞ. The SPV itself invests in
Figure 17. Cash ﬂows under a LLS
150 Although this did not seem to be a problem with mortgage-backed securities until the emergence of the
GFC in 2007.
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AAA-rated, ﬁxed-interest securities of appropriate duration or uses ﬂoating rate notes plus an
interest-rate swap.
12.2.5. The LLS bond holders pay an initial premium that is used to buy the ﬁxed-interest securities
and to pay an initial commission to the SPV manager. The bond holders in return receive coupons
and, possibly, a ﬁnal repayment of principal that is linked to a reference index, X(t), that matches151
as closely as possible the combined cashﬂows, rather than to LA(t), LB(t) or LC(t). Any differences
accrue to or are paid by the SPV manager. The bond holders will not normally be hedgers them-
selves, so they will expect a fair premium over market ﬁxed-interest rates in return for assuming the
longevity risk.
12.2.6. Finally, the LLS might take the form of a catastrophe (or cat) bond (similar to the Kortis
bond). In this case, the repayment of principal would be determined by the value of an index-based
underlying, with appropriate attachment and exhaustion points.
12.2.7. To be more concrete, the underlying index X(t) that the LLS makes reference to is derived
from, e.g. national population mortality rates, and is constructed in a way to achieve the optimal
balance between hedge effectiveness for the reinsurer, within the cat bond structure, and the risk-
return proﬁle to investors. For a cat bond with attachment and exhaustion points AP and EP, the
payoff at maturity will be the full bond nominal, N, if X(T) < AP, N(1 − (X(T)−AP)/(EP−AP)) if
AP≤X(T) < EP, and 0 if EP≤X(T).
12.2.8. The hedge is most likely to be effective if the reinsurer takes on a balanced and well
diversiﬁed group of transactions with the primary hedgers (A, B and C above). For example, if the
primary reinsurance transactions are wholly with blue collar pension plans, then an index-based LLS
will be much less effective for the reinsurer. A low level of population basis risk turns out not to
require exact matching of the national population (e.g. the aggregation of A, B and C). For example,
Cairns et al. (2017a) demonstrate that an aggregated portfolio that covers 80% of the population
but is also heavily skewed in value terms towards wealthier and healthier people can have a cor-
relation with the national population that is well above 95%.
12.2.9. The marketing of LLS to ILS investors has great potential, following the introduction of
comprehensive UK regulations for ILS in 2017, particularly if it takes the cat bond structure familiar
to such investors, according to consultants Hymans Robertson. This is because longevity risk is
becoming better understood and its volatility and correlation with other asset classes is low. Hymans
Robertson argues that “Bulk annuity insurers could use [ILS] to provide additional capital to ﬁnance
large deals (particularly where reinsurance is expensive or difﬁcult to obtain) or to optimise their
capital positions by rebalancing the risks on their balance sheets.” With the ILS investor base
broadening all the time and an increasing amount of capital ﬂowing into the market from other
sophisticated investor sources, there is a growing pool of capital for which longevity or bulk-annuity
linked risks might be attractive.152
151 The match might be expressed in cashﬂow terms or in value terms. In the latter case, the value of X(t), is
intended to hedge the value of the liability at a speciﬁed maturity.
152 Artemis (2017) ILS has potential in UK longevity and backing annuity deals: Hymans Robertson;www.
artemis.bm/BLOG/2017/08/21/ILS-HAS-POTENTIAL-IN-UK-LONGEVITY-BACKING-ANNUITY-DEALS-
HYMANS-ROBERTSON/
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12.3. Potential New Solution: Reinsurance Sidecars
12.3.1. Another potential solution is the reinsurance sidecar – which is a way to share risks with new
investors when the latter are concerned about the ceding reinsurer having an informational
advantage.
12.3.2. Formally, a reinsurance sidecar is a ﬁnancial structure established to allow external investors
to take on the risk and beneﬁt from the return of speciﬁc books of insurance or reinsurance business.
It is typically set up by existing (re)insurers that are looking to either partner with another source of
capital or set up an entity to enable them to accept capital from third-party investors (Kessler et al.,
2016).
12.3.3. It is established as a SPV, with a maturity of 2–3 years. It is capitalised by specialist insurance
funds, usually by preference shares, though sometimes in the form of debt instruments. It reinsures a
deﬁned pre-agreed book of business or categories of risk. Liability is limited to assets of the SPV and
the vehicle is unrated.
12.3.4. The beneﬁt to insurers is that sidecars can provide protection against exposure to peak
longevity risks,153 help with capital management by providing additional capacity without the need
for permanent capital, and can provide an additional source of income by leveraging underwriting
expertise. The beneﬁt to investors is that they enjoy targeted non-correlated returns relating to
speciﬁc short-horizon risks and have an agreed procedure for exiting; investors can also take
advantage of temporary price hikes, but without facing legacy issues that could affect an investment
in a typical insurer.
12.3.5. Figure 18 shows a typical sidecar structure.
12.3.6. There are a number of challenges to the use of sidecars in the longevity risk transfer market.
There is the tension between the long-term nature of longevity risk and investor preference for a
short-term investment horizon. There are also regulatory requirements on cedants, affecting their
Figure 18. Typical sidecar structure
Source: PFI.
153 That is, speciﬁc individual cashﬂows that give rise to the greatest uncertainty in value terms
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ability to generate a return. These include: the posting of prudent collateral, the underlying assets in
the SPV must generate matching cash ﬂows, the risk transfer must be genuine, and the custodian/
trustee must be ﬁnancially strong. There is also a risk to cedants of losing capital relief if regulatory
requirements are not met or they change.
12.4. Why Could These Potential Solutions Be Successful Now?
The principal reason why these solutions might be more successful now in a way that they were not a
decade ago is the capacity constraint in the (re)insurance industry – it does not have the capital or
experienced personnel to take on unlimited longevity risk. The only long-term solution to this
capacity constraint is to bring in new investors from the capital markets (i.e. to transfer the risk to the
capital markets). These investors will include ILS investors, hedge funds, private equity investors,
sovereign wealth funds, endowments, family ofﬁces and other investors seeking asset classes that
have low correlation with existing ﬁnancial assets. However, two issues need to be resolved. First, the
hedger needs assurance that the solution sold to these investors provides an effective hedge. Second,
these investors need some assurance that they are not going to be sold a “lemon.”154 There have been
many attempts over the last decade to provide both types of assurance – without any real success.
This time it might be – and certainly needs to be – different. An early sign of success for the
reinsurance sidecar structure came at the beginning of 2018 when RGA Re and RenaissanceRe,
announced a new start-up named Langhorne Re, which will target in-force life and annuity business.
The new company has secured $780m of equity capital from RGA, RenaissanceRe and third-party
sidecar investors, including pension funds and other life companies.155
13. Conclusions
13.1. As Michaelson & Mulholland (2014) point out:
the longevity risk inherent in the world’s aggregate retirement obligations is far in excess of the
amount of risk capital the global insurance industry could realistically bring to bear against
this risk.156 Seen in this light, it becomes painfully obvious that vast sums of additional risk
capital must be dedicated to adequately managing longevity risk. It is similarly evident that the
only source capable of providing such quantities of capital, and thus assuming a meaningful
amount of the world’s longevity risk, are the global capital markets…. The mission is clear –
longevity risk must be successfully turned into an asset class capable of attracting these vast
pools of capital, or else the world’s retirement systems will struggle to signiﬁcantly reduce their
longevity exposures in an efﬁcient manner. However, developing capital markets solutions
that are readily acceptable by a wide spectrum of institutional investors – given the complexity
154 Originally a “lemon” was a defective second-hand car offered for sale on an “as good as new” basis. It
now refers to any product where the seller has more information about its true worth than any potential buyer. In
other words, the seller has an informational advantage and needs to ﬁnd a way of demonstrating the true value to
the potential buyer in order to secure a sale (see Akerlof, 1970). The most effective way of achieving this for the
reinsurer is to “keep some skin in the game” by agreeing to co-share downside risks with the new sidecar investors
(as explained in Bifﬁs & Blake, 2014).
155 https://www.reinsurancene.ws/langhorne-re-launched-rga-renre-force-life-annuity-reinsurer/
156 Total global reinsurer capital was just $595bn at 31 December 2016 (Aon Benﬁeld, Reinsurance Market
Outlook April 2017).
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and uncertainty in modelling this long-term risk – requires innovative solutions from dedicated
and experienced ﬁnancial institutions.
There are four major challenges.
13.2. First, in order to expand the investor base, there is a need to close the gap between the
preferences of stakeholders: buyers and sellers of longevity protection. Currently, long-term capital-
market investors prefer bonds, while, as the paper has outlined, the most successful solutions have
been longevity swaps. While short-term mortality bonds have been a success, long-term longevity
bonds have not been similarly successful so far. So more creative approaches that develop a carefully
structured risk management chain are needed to meet the differing requirements and risk appetites of
stakeholders. However, the Swiss Re strategy of gradual iteration from a successful innovation – as
exempliﬁed in the Kortis longevity spread bond which was a modest adaptation of the Vita mortality
bond in terms of design and maturity – appears to show a way forward, as do elements of the recent
NN Life transaction in the Netherlands. The two key prizes, if successful, are a much bigger investor
base and much greater market liquidity.
13.3. Second, there needs to be a common agreement between market participants on which mor-
tality model to use for the design and pricing of each longevity-linked deal. One of the main reasons
why Aegon’s deal with Société Générale went ahead in 2013 was that all parties agreed to use the
same mortality model. Even if a mortality model produces the wrong forecasts – which it is bound to
do – as long as those forecasts are not systematically biased, then it becomes a potential candidate for
use in this market.
13.4. Third, a number of operational issues need to be dealt with. These include basis risk, credit
risk, collateral and liquidity. Not only will this require market participants to work out the optimal
trade-offs between basis risk and liquidity and between credit risk and collateral, it will also require
the regulator to be willing to grant fair levels of regulatory capital relief for index-based hedge
solutions that are compatible with current solvency capital requirements and consistent with levels of
capital relief for customised longevity hedges, thereby putting both types of hedge on a level footing.
13.5. Fourth, it is important to engage with the regulator. This was the key message of Richard
Sandor, a serial starter of new markets, such as the ﬁnancial futures, climate exchange and Ameribor
markets,157 when he spoke at the Longevity 12 conference in September 2016.158 He said that he
always worked closely with the regulator when he was introducing a new product or market, so that
there would be no surprises on the launch date. Failure to do this in the case of some of the early
Dutch tail-risk protection deals meant that the Dutch regulator did not give the capital relief that was
anticipated at the design stage. Regulators can also have big unintended consequences if, instead of
engaging with them, there are attempts to circumvent them. For example, regulatory responses to the
Global Financial Crisis (such as the US Dodd-Frank Act) had a signiﬁcant effect in slowing down the
establishment of longevity-linked capital market securities – which had nothing to do with the crisis
itself. Regulations restricting the risk-taking activities of investment banks and new bank capital
rules (Basel III) severely limited the role that banks could play in the development of this market. For
example, it became virtually impossible for them to warehouse risk while matching longevity hedgers
and longevity investors; and it even became unattractive for them to intermediate, standing in the
157 http://www.futuresmag.com/2016/03/21/inventing-new-market
158 https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/longevity-12
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middle between hedgers and investors, because the long-dated, illiquid credit exposure associated
with longevity transactions now carried increased capital requirements.159 While signiﬁcant parts of
the Dodd-Frank Act are in the process of being repealed, there is little sign that investment banks –
the traditional conduit for introducing new capital from global investors, such as sovereign wealth
funds – are returning to the longevity risk market.
13.6. These four challenges will need to be addressed in the next stage of the development of this
market. But innovation has been an important feature of the longevity market since 2006 and there is
every reason to believe that this will continue as the different players in the industry seek to meet the
growing demand for longevity risk transfers, while reducing costs, optimising capital and
managing risks.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 lists UK pension buy-ins over £100m between 2007 and 2016, while Table A2 lists the
publicly announced longevity swaps that have been executed between 2007 and 2016 in the UK.
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Table A1. UK Pension Buy-ins over £100m, 2007–2016
Hedger Name Size (£m) Sector Insurer Date
Aggregate Industries 305 Mining Pension Insurance
Corporation
February 10
Aggregate Industries 135 Mining Just Retirement
Partnership
July 16
Aon 150 Financial Services MetLife (now Rothesay
Life)
June 09
Aon 105 Financial Services Pension Insurance
Corporation
March 12
Aon 210 Financial Services Pension Insurance
Corporation
October 14
Aon 890 Financial services Pension Insurance
Corporation
March 16
BBA Aviation 270 Aviation Legal & General April 08
Cable & Wireless 1,050 Communications Prudential September 08
Cadbury 500 Food Producer Pension Insurance
Corporation
December 09
CDC 370 Public Rothesay Life November 09
Civil Aviation Authority 1,600 Public Rothesay Life July 15
Cobham 280 Aerospace &
Defence
Rothesay Life July 13
Cookson 320 Engineering Pension Insurance
Corporation
July 12
Dairy Crest 150 Food Producer Legal & General December 08
Dairy Crest 150 Food Producer Legal & General June 09
Friends Provident 360 Financial Services Aviva April 08
GKN 125 Engineering Rothesay Life January 14
GKN 190 Engineering Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 16
GlaxoSmithKline 900 Pharmaceutical Prudential November 10
Home Retail Group 280 Retail Prudential June 11
Hunting 110 Energy Paternoster (now
Rothesay Life)
January 07
ICI 3,000 Chemicals Legal & General March 14
ICI 600 Chemicals Prudential March 14
ICI 300 Chemicals Prudential November 14
ICI 500 Chemicals Legal & General March 15
ICI 500 Chemicals Prudential June 15
ICI 500 Chemicals Legal & General June 15
ICI 330 Chemicals Legal & General March 16
ICI 630 Chemicals Scottish Widows June 16
ICI 750 Chemicals Legal & General July 16
ICI 590 Chemicals Scottish Widows September 16
ICI 380 Chemicals Legal & General September 16
ICI Specialty Chemicals 220 Chemicals Prudential August 15
ICI Specialty Chemicals 140 Chemicals Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 16
Interserve 300 Construction Aviva July 14
JLT 120 Financial Services Prudential September 13
Kingﬁsher 230 Retail Legal & General December 15
London Stock Exchange 160 Financial Services Pension Insurance
Corporation
May 11
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Table A1. (Continued )
Hedger Name Size (£m) Sector Insurer Date
Meat & Livestock Commission 150 Food Producer Aviva June 11
MNOPF 500 Shipping Lucida (now Legal &
General)
September 09
MNOPF 100 Various Lucida (now Legal &
General)
May 10
Morgan Crucible 160 Engineering Lucida (now Legal &
General)
March 08
Next 125 Retail Aviva August 10
Northern Bank 680 Financial Services Prudential April 15
Ofcom 150 Public Legal & General July 08
P&O 800 UK Ports
Business
Paternoster (now
Rothesay Life)
December 07
Pensions Trust 225 Charities Paternoster (now
Rothesay Life)
July 08
Philips 480 Technology Rothesay Life August 13
Philips 300 Technology Prudential June 14
Philips 310 Technology Prudential September 14
Pilkington 230 Manufacturing Pension Insurance
Corporation
August 16
Smith & Nephew 190 Medical Rothesay Life January 13
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Legal & General March 08
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Paternoster (now
Rothesay Life)
September 08
Smiths Group 150 Engineering Rothesay Life September 11
Smiths Group 170 Engineering Pension Insurance
Corporation
September 13
Smiths Group 250 Engineering Pension Insurance
Corporation
October 16
Tate & Lyle 350 Food Producer Legal & General December 12
Taylor Wimpey 205 Housebuilding Partnership December 14
The Church of England 100 Charities Prudential February 14
Total 1,600 Oil and Gas Pension Insurance
Corporation
June 14
Undisclosed 145 Undisclosed Legal & General January 09
Undisclosed 220 Retail Legal & General March 09
Undisclosed 100 Manufacturing MetLife (now Rothesay
Life)
January 10
Undisclosed 100 Retail Aviva March 10
Undisclosed 185 Banking Aviva December 10
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Legal & General May 11
Undisclosed 145 Property MetLife (now Rothesay
Life)
November 11
Undisclosed 250 Media Aviva December 11
Undisclosed 110 Undisclosed Aviva December 11
Undisclosed 250 Undisclosed Legal & General August 12
Undisclosed 140 Undisclosed Prudential August 12
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 12
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
December 12
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Table A1. (Continued )
Hedger Name Size (£m) Sector Insurer Date
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
April 13
Undisclosed 200 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 14
Undisclosed 300 Unknown Aviva June 15
Undisclosed 120 Undisclosed Just Retirement October 15
Undisclosed 200 Undisclosed Scottish Widows April 16
Undisclosed 130 Undisclosed Just Retirement
Partnership
July 16
Undisclosed 150 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
September 16
Undisclosed 100 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
September 16
Undisclosed 245 Unknown Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 16
Undisclosed 105 Undisclosed Pension Insurance
Corporation
November 16
Undisclosed* 120 Undisclosed Rothesay Life June 14
Unilever 130 Consumer goods Legal & General September 14
Weir Group 240 Engineering Legal & General December 07
West Ferry Printers 130 Printing Aviva September 08
West Midlands Integrated Transport
Authority
270 Transport Prudential April 12
Western United 115 Mining Rothesay Life November 12
Western United 110 Food Producer Rothesay Life March 14
Wiggins Teape 400 Manufacturing Scottish Widows November 15
Source: LCP (Professional Pensions, 26 January 2017).
Notes: Information collected from insurance company data and publicly announced transactions in H2 2016.
*This deal was completed during Q3 2014.
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Table A2. UK Longevity Swaps, 2007–2017
Date Hedger Type
Size
(£m)
Term
(years) Format
Receiver or
Intermediary
April 2007 Friends’ Provident Ins 1,700 Run-off Reinsurance contract Swiss Re
February 2008 Lucida Ins N/A 10 Index-based hedge;
exposure placed with
capital market investors
J. P. Morgan
September 2008 Canada Life Ins 500 40 Exposure placed with
capital market investors
J. P. Morgan
February 2009 Abbey Life Ins 1,500 Run-off Reinsurance contract Deutsche Bank
March 2009 Aviva Ins 475 10 Exposure placed with
capital market investors &
Partner RE
RBS
May 2009 Babcock PF 500–750 50 Reinsurance contract with
Pac Life Re
Credit Suisse
July 2009 RSA Ins 1,900 Run-off Reinsurance contract with
Rothesay Life; combined
with inﬂation & interest
rate swaps
Goldman Sachs/
Rothesay
December 2009 Berkshire
Council
PF 1,000 Run-off Reinsurance contract Swiss Re
February 2010 BMW PF 3,000 Run-off Reinsurance contract Deutsche Bank,
Paternoster
July 2010 British Airways PF 1,300 NA Synthetic buy-in (longevity
swap + asset swap)
Goldman Sachs/
Rothesay
February 2011 Pall (UK) PF 70 10 Index-based hedge;
exposure placed with
capital market investors
J. P. Morgan
August 2011 ITV PF 1,700 NA Reinsurance contract Credit Suisse
November 2011 Rolls Royce PF 3,000 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Deutsche Bank
December 2011 British Airways PF 1,300 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Goldman Sachs/
Rothesay
December 2011 Pilkington PF 1,000 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Legal & General
April 2012 Berkshire
Council
PF 100 Run-off Insurance contract Swiss Re
May 2012 Akzo Nobel PF 1,400 NA Insurance contract Swiss Re
July 2012 Pension Insurance
Corp
Ins 300 NA Insurance contract Munich Re
December 2012 LV= Ins 800 NA Insurance contract Swiss Re
December 2012 Pension Insurance
Corp
Ins 400 NA Insurance contract Munich Re
February 2011 Pall (UK) PF 70 10 Index-based hedge;
exposure placed with
capital market investors
J. P. Morgan
August 2011 ITV PF 1,700 NA Reinsurance contract Credit Suisse
November 2011 Rolls Royce PF 3,000 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Deutsche Bank
December 2011 British Airways PF 1,300 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Goldman Sachs/
Rothesay
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Table A2. (Continued )
Date Hedger Type
Size
(£m)
Term
(years) Format
Receiver or
Intermediary
December 2011 Pilkington PF 1,000 NA Pensioner bespoke longevity
swap
Legal & General
April 2012 Berkshire
Council
PF 100 Run-off Insurance contract Swiss Re
May 2012 Akzo Nobel PF 1,400 NA Insurance contract Swiss Re
July 2012 Pension Insurance
Corp
Ins 300 NA Insurance contract Munich Re
March 2014 Aviva Staff
Pension Scheme
PF 5,000 NA Insurance contract Munich Re, Scor
and Swiss Re
May 2014 Royal London Ins 1,000 NA Insurance contract RGA
International
July 2014 BT Pension
Scheme
PF 16,000 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
August 2014 Rothesay Life Ins 1,000 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
August 2014 Phoenix Group
Pension Scheme
PF 900 NA Insurance contract Phoenix Life
October 2014 Legal & General Ins 1,350 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Retirement
Insurance and
Annuity
Company
December 2014 Rothesay Life Ins 1,000 NA Insurance contract Paciﬁc Life Re
January 2015 Rothesay Life Ins 300 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
January 2015 Merchant Navy
Ofﬁcers’
Pension Fund
PF 1,500 NA Insurance contract Paciﬁc Life Re
February 2015 Scottish Power PF 2,000 NA Insurance contract Abbey Life
April 2015 and
June 2015
Pension Insurance
Corp
Ins >1,600 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
July 2015 AXA UK Pension
Scheme
PF 2,800 NA Insurance contract RGA
International
August 2015 Legal & General Ins 1,850 NA Insurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
September 2015 Scottish &
Newcastle
PF 2,400 NA Insurance contract Friends Life,
Swiss Re
November 2015 RAC (2003) PF 600 NA Insurance contract SCOR Se
December 2015 Unnamed PF 90 NA Insurance contract Zurich, Paciﬁc
Life Re
April 2016 Legal & General Ins NA NA Reinsurance contract Prudential
August 2016 Scottish Power PF 1,000 NA Reinsurance contract Abbey Life
August 2016 Pirelli PF 600 NA Reinsurance contract Zurich, Paciﬁc
Life Re
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Table A2. (Continued )
Date Hedger Type
Size
(£m)
Term
(years) Format
Receiver or
Intermediary
January 2017 NA PF 300 NA Reinsurance contract Zurich, SCOR
August 2017 SSE PF 800 NA Reinsurance contract Legal & General
September 2017 British Airways PF 1,600 NA Reinsurance contract Partner Re,
Canada Life Re
September 2017 Marsh &
McLennan
PF 3,400 NA Reinsurance contract Canada Life Re,
Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
November 2017 Pension Insurance
Corp
Ins 900 NA Reinsurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
December 2017 Legal & General Ins 600 NA Reinsurance contract Prudential
Insurance Co of
America
Note: Ins – hedger is insurance company; PF – hedger is pension fund, http://www.artemis.bm/library/
longevity_swaps_risk_transfers.html
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